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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the tactics used by the U.S. Army during 2004-2005 in Iraq.  
The central aim of this study is to understand why the Army chose tactics that were ill-
suited to the conflict and why it took nearly three years to adapt to conditions in Iraq.   
The Army applied doctrine that was familiar to it as an institution and was 
reluctant to accept tactics and changes in conduct that might violate its culture and 
doctrine.  Tactics employed by many Army units were more akin to a counter-terror 
campaign rather than a counterinsurgency.  A counter-terror operation is focused on the 
defeat of the enemy directly through kinetic means while a counterinsurgency focuses on 
defeating the enemy indirectly by interrupting the insurgents’ ideology and base of 
support. 
The greatest inhibitors to innovation in Iraq were commanders who resisted 
innovation because they did not understand the nature of the conflict in which they were 
engaged.  They also were restricted by traditional Army culture. 
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This thesis examines why the U.S. military pursued tactics in Iraq that were not 
meeting the policy objectives set by the George W. Bush administration. The tactics used 
were not consistent with current counterinsurgency doctrine.  The goal of this thesis is 
three-fold: (1) to establish the context that U.S. military commanders were using to 
formulate strategy from 2004-2005; (2) to examine the reasons why military commanders 
chose tactics that were ill-suited to the battle space; and (3) to establish some conclusions 
about the way the U.S. Army has adapted its doctrine to fight in Iraq and the potential 
effects for future operations.  The thesis identifies the factors that influenced tactical 
commanders’ decision making and tactical planning and describes how strategy is 
translated into tactics on the ground in a conflict.  The thesis identifies nuances about 
military organizations and provides insight for policy makers and military commanders 
into how policy is interpreted and translated into action. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The idea that a gap exists between policy makers and the tactics used to achieve 
policy objectives is not new.  It is well understood that actions by tactical units can 
negatively effect the accomplishment of policy objectives; what is not understood is why 
tactical commanders conduct themselves in a manner that does not contribute to 
achieving the goals of policy makers.  Furthermore, there is a gap in the literature in 
regards to the U.S. Army’s lack of success in the Iraq War.  This thesis relies on first-
hand experience in Iraq and applicable theory to explain these issues and to provide 
learning points for future counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are three literatures used in this study:  (1) specific information on the 
policies, strategy and conduct of the War in Iraq; (2) writings on the conduct of counter-
insurgency warfare; (3) literature that provides insight into how military organizations or 
organizations in general “learn” and make decisions. 
1.   General Literature on Iraq Policies and Strategy 
There is little debate about the policies and objectives of the U.S. government in 
Iraq during the period of 2005-2006.  The policies are set forth clearly through the 
National Defense Strategy (2005),1 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 
Terrorism 2006 and the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (2005).2  A debate exists, 
however, about whether or not these objectives were achievable by the U.S. military (as 
the lead organization), whether these objectives were sufficiently important to justify the 
expenditure of American blood and treasure on, and why these policies have not achieved 
their intended goal of bringing freedom and democracy, or at a minimum stability and 
security, to Iraq.  
 Michael Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor authors of Cobra II,3 and Robert 
Brigham author of Is Iraq another Vietnam4 blame the Bush administration for failing to 
bring stability to Iraq.  Specific reasons for this failure were attributed to a lack of 
intelligence, a lack of synergy within and between intelligence agencies, a lack of 
planning for winning the peace after the initial invasion, the bellicosity of the Bush 
administration,5 and a misguided belief in the preeminence and appeal of the uniquely 
American version of democracy and capitalism.6  While this criticism is relevant, it is not 
                                                 
1 National Defense Strategy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, March 2005. 
2 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, Washington, DC, November 2005. 
3 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and 
Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006). 
4 Robert K. Brigham, Is Iraq Another Vietnam, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Perseus Books Group, 
2006). 
5 Brigham, 498. 
6 Brigham, 1-3. 
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sufficient to explain the military’s inability to facilitate the necessary first steps in the 
process of nation building.  In other words, these critics cannot explain why the military 
failed to provide security and some moderate level of stability to facilitate the economic 
and political reforms that will ultimately provide lasting change.  Although the utility of 
using the U.S. military to promote nation building is not universally recognized, most 
observers agree that there is a role for the military in nation building and that it cannot be 
accomplished through purely diplomatic means.  Most observers also recognize that the 
U.S. military is the only organization that has the infrastructure and capability to 
undertake such an endeavor.  
The U.S. military is a necessary element of an effective nation-building mission 
and must be able to conduct such operations.  Most literature has tended to focus the lack 
of success at the highest levels of the U.S. executive branch or the Department of 
Defense, while little attention is given to the issues within the Department of Defense of 
how effective nation building or Counterinsurgency Operations is conducted by field 
units.  Today, there is a doctrinal debate within the U.S. Army on how to conduct a 
counterinsurgency strategy and how to transition from high-intensity conflict to a nation-
building or counterinsurgency strategy.7 
Why does the U.S. military seem unable to accomplish nation building or stability 
and support objectives (recognizing, of course, that the military is not the sole solution 
but is a necessary first step in facilitating the conditions to execute stability operations)?  
To answer this question this study focuses on the organization that is currently carrying 
the heaviest load of the effort in Iraq, which is the U.S. Army. 
 John Nagl’s work provides some of the most relevant insights into the ability of 
the U.S. Army to respond to the changing nature of warfare.8  In Learning to Eat Soup 
with a Knife, he provides a comparative analysis of the British and American armies in 
counterinsurgency conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam.  The intent of the book is to 
demonstrate which of the armies were able to adapt to the challenges of the conflict in 
which it was engaged.   His conclusion is that the British Army was better structured and 
                                                 
7 Gordon and Trainor, 447. 
8 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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politically enabled to be more of learning organization than the American Army and was 
thus able to change to meet the specific challenges of the counterinsurgency fight in 
Malaya.  Conversely, the U.S. Army was rigid in its doctrine, and tactics. The 
organization was unwilling to change to meet the specific challenges of the Vietnam 
conflict.  Nagl’s work suggests that the U.S. Army would have a tough time adapting to 
meet the exigencies of the war in Iraq.  Although his analysis covers up until the early 
1990s, the problems he identifies are similar to problems the U.S. Army is experiencing 
in Iraq.  According to Nagl, “the American approach is an over-weaning reliance on 
technology, a faith in the uniqueness and the moral mission of the United States, and a 
remarkable aversion to the use of unconventional tactics.”9 This study builds upon Nagl’s 
analysis by determining the level of institutional learning that has occurred within the 
U.S. Army as evidenced by the selection of tactics employed in Iraq in 2004-2005. 
To provide this insight into the context in which the U.S. Army experienced or 
perceived the Iraq War in the summer of 2005, I will largely draw from my personal 
experience as a Company Commander for A CO (Company), 1 BCT (Brigade Combat 
Team), 10th Mountain Division, which deployed to Iraq from August of 2005 to August 
of 2006.  I also draw from articles in military journals to support my description of the 
conflict and how that related to the accepted doctrine and tactics employed by the U.S. 
Army. 
2. Literature on Counter-insurgency Warfare 
There are two overall strategies for winning a counterinsurgency engagement.  
First, is the “strong hand” approach, which would entail complete domination of a local 
population and the terrain to deny the insurgents’ ability to influence the population or 
gain any tactical advantage.  Second, is the “winning the hearts and minds” of the 
population strategy or “soft hand” approach.  The “strong hand” method, although 
recognized as being effective in the past, is not a method that in today’s environment of 
instant media attention and global interconnectedness would be condoned by the 
international community. It also does not mesh with the U.S. goals of bringing freedom 
                                                 
9 Nagl, 43-44. 
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and democracy to the world.10  The “soft hand” approach has many supporters in the 
field of counterinsurgency warfare.  It is the basis of the recently published FM 3-24 Joint 
“Counterinsurgency” Manual.11  In all recent works, there seems little debate about how 
a counterinsurgency should be conducted to be successful.  The strategy can be summed 
up in the phrase, “to defeat an insurgency you have to know who the insurgents are and to 
find that out, you have to win and keep the support of the people.”12   This thesis tests the 
prescriptions of FM 3-24 to determine if the period from 2004 to 2005 saw evidence of a 
U.S. Army that had “learned” counterinsurgency doctrine.  It also might be possible to 
discover if the organization was struggling to redefine itself in light of the experience of 
the Iraq war. 
The sources used in this study were chosen because they provide specific insight 
into the tactical employment of a counterinsurgency strategy, rather than those that 
approach the subject from the strategic level of analysis.  These sources have the most 
utility in providing points of comparison in how theorists have stated counterinsurgency 
tactics should be employed as compared with how it was actually accomplished.  The 
works used here tend to provide tactical level prescriptions and are unified in the theory 
that counterinsurgency conflicts are essentially won or lost at the small unit level.  Many 
of the widely accepted axioms of today are ideas that are espoused by these authors, such 
as the idea of the “strategic corporal” or the “ink spot approach.”   
3. Literature on Decision Making 
There is a wealth of information on decision making behavior. Two specific 
theories -- the Organizational Behavior Model and Prospect Theory -- provide different 
yet relevant insights into how and why decisions are made by the tactical commanders.  
The Organizational Behavior Model posits that organizations, and the leaders 
within them, operate and perform analysis based on adopted rules, norms, and routines.  
                                                 
10 Nagl, 27-28. 
11 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Department of the Army and Marine Corps, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
12 Nagl, xiii. 
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Within the military these are recognized as doctrine, SOPs (standard operating 
procedures), and TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures).  Large organizations are 
typically prone to satisficing: selecting the first alternative that is acceptable, not 
necessarily the best solution.  Additionally, success in this system will often be based on 
compliance with SOPs rather than the accomplishment of overall national objectives.  
When faced with a need to change, organizations are likely to define problems and 
solutions within the construct of the procedures that they are used to rather then trying to 
change the organization. They will try to solve new problems with old ideas or 
procedures. 
Organizational behavior also can be viewed as an output of the organization that 
performs it.13  This theory provides internal insight into why the military has had an 
enduring focus on the “offense” as the means to victory in conflict, even though 
counterinsurgency warfare is defensively oriented. 
Prospect Theory posits that the frame of reference or the situation in which the 
individual or group experiences an event effects the decision making process.  It proposes 
that people are more likely to be risk averse when things are perceived as going well and 
to be risk acceptant when things are perceived to be going poorly.14  This theory provides 
an external perspective into why the military was willing to accept risks in the initial 
stages of the war but as time went on and gains were made, ground forces became more 
risk averse.  This risk aversion translated into garrison warfare: troops massed in large 
bases to ensure greater protection and safety but at the loss of influence in the 
communities they are supposed to be protecting.  Current events surrounding the “Anbar 
Awakening” seem to corroborate Prospect Theory as an explanatory theory for decision 
making. Riskier tactics were adopted only when the province was deemed lost to the 
enemy. 
                                                 
13 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
second edition, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 152. 
14 Jack Levy, “Application of Prospect Theory to Political Science,” Synthese. Dordrecht: Vol. 135, 
Iss. 2 (May 2003): 215. 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis first describes current Army doctrine as set forth in the recently 
published joint counterinsurgency manual to provide a description of how 
counterinsurgency should be conducted and to identify primary themes from the 
document.  It then identifies the policies and doctrine, or better described as a lack there 
of, that was in place in 2004 and how those policies were translated into a tactical plan or 
strategy.  I will then compare the Army “doctrine” of 2004-2005 with the themes 
established from FM 3-24 and identify the specific ways that our approach was flawed. 
Prospect theory and the Organizational theories will then be used to explain what 
motivates and influences commanders when it comes to translating policy into action.  By 
utilizing empirical as well normative evidence to explain how the Army adapted to the 
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II. COIN DOCTRINE AS IT EXISTS TODAY 
This study explains why tactical level leaders in Iraq were not able to accomplish 
the strategic goals set forth by the Bush Administration.  Specifically, the Army failed to 
foster a security situation necessary to pursue peaceful political change in Iraq. The Army 
was unsuccessful because it did not have a coherent and universally accepted 
understanding of counterinsurgency and it utilized inappropriate tactics and doctrine once 
the United States had defeated the regime of Saddam Hussein.  This is evidenced by 
Army units choosing, training, and executing ineffective or counter-productive tactics.  
This chapter will establish what counterinsurgency should be.  To accomplish this, 
portions of FM 3-24 are described to identify the central themes of effective 
counterinsurgency doctrine at the tactical level.15  FM 3-24 uniquely captures the 
significant aspects of the tactical execution of counterinsurgency that must be understood 
in order for a counterinsurgent to be successful.  These central themes have relevance 
both in terms of the methods employed by tactical units and their overall influence on the 
tactical situation.  
FM 3-24 is the basis of currently accepted and appropriate counterinsurgency 
doctrine. FM 3-24 synthesizes multiple facets of counterinsurgency theory, practice (both 
past and present), and complimentary social science literature and thought.  It is one of 
the only military manuals to both present a method for accomplishing a mission assigned 
and simultaneously capturing the significant debates within the subject.  It presents the 
issues of debate (paradoxes) without distracting from the clarity of the methods 
promoted.  This is significant for tactical level leaders. Most military doctrine to date has 
been presented in a, “one answer to one identified problem set” approach (SOPs, tactical 
manuals, Battle Drills).  Doctrine such as FM 3-24, reinforces the central tenets of a 
transformed military that is able to learn “how” to think about solutions for a problem as 
opposed to being given “what” to think.  Most counterinsurgency literature and theory, 
according to David Galula, is written in such a way that, “very little is offered beyond 
                                                 
15 Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters Department of the Army and Marine Corps, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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formulas.”16  FM 3-24 is clear in that it sets the framework for understanding insurgent 
warfare while stating that a “one size fits all solution” is not available or appropriate to 
counterinsurgency.  This manual provides one of the most effective tools for tactical 
leaders to understand how to plan for and execute a counterinsurgency operation. 
A. MILITARY COIN DOCTRINE  
FM 3-24 is the current culmination of the joint Army and Marine efforts to 
provide a current and historically supported doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare. 
Before FM 3-24, no revision in doctrine had been made for over 40 years.  Although it 
states clearly that its intended audience is leaders and planners at the battalion level and 
above, the majority of Chapter 1 and Appendix A have a wealth of information for 
commanders at the company and platoon level.  These materials can provide the context 
for decision-making at the tactical level.  The following sections address the information 
that can provide insights into the Army’s current view of tactical counterinsurgency 
doctrine:  1) Principles derived from past insurgencies; 2) Imperatives based on current 
Counterinsurgency Operations; and 3) Appendix A (Kilcullen’s 28 Articles17). 
1. Principles Derived from Past Insurgencies 
This section of FM 3-24 provides the historical themes of counterinsurgency.  
Although they are important and can influence tactical level decisions, they are primarily 
intended to provide the framework for understanding how effective counterinsurgency 
doctrine will lead to political success.  They can be broken down into principles that 
apply to goal setting and methods for counterinsurgent forces.   
Counterinsurgency goals include establishing legitimacy to accomplish political 
aims. Political goals are paramount to any lasting success in a counterinsurgency. FM 3-
24 acknowledges, and it is central to an appropriate understanding of a 
counterinsurgency, that a unified effort towards accomplishing political aims is the 
                                                 
16 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, (West Port, Connecticut: Praeger 
Security International, 2006), xiii. 
17 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Article, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” 
Military Review, 3 (May-June 2006), 1-11. 
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primary objective of a counterinsurgency.  The greatest contributing factor to success is 
establishing and sustaining the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent forces.  This can only 
occur if there is unity of effort within the political and military arms of a counterinsurgent 
force.  The counterinsurgent’s right to be there has to be accepted by the local population 
and this must be sustained by quickly transitioning responsibility to the host nation 
government.  A central aspect behind the legitimacy of any actor involved in a 
counterinsurgency is the degree of consent or coercion of the governed that is required to 
facilitate control of the population.  Evaluation of this aspect is the best way to determine 
whether a population believes it is represented by or oppressed by those who have 
influence over them.  In a counterinsurgency, the goal should always be to facilitate the 
rapid transition of control by the counterinsurgent to the local government and security 
apparatus.  
The rest of the principles in this section of FM 3-24 describe the way that the 
counterinsurgent should frame understanding of the enemy and the specific nature of a 
counterinsurgency environment. Specifically, commanders conducting counterinsurgency 
and nation building must understand the unique role of the non-combatants and local 
populations. Commanders conducting counterinsurgency must understand the 
environment in which they operate, the nature and tactics of the enemy elements, and 
how the counterinsurgent can effectively interdict the enemy’s activities.  The support 
and trust of locals will be the key to a successful counterinsurgency.  Local support is 
attained through providing security and establishing the rule of law thus breaking the link 
between the insurgent and his base of support (the population).  Once the insurgent does 
not have the ability to intimidate or influence the local population, locals are inclined to 
provide the intelligence to the counterinsurgent that ultimately leads to the elimination of 
the insurgent forces. FM 3-24 also warns that insurgencies are long-term in nature and 
must be approached with long-term and lasting solutions.  
2. Imperatives of COIN Operations 
The Imperative section of FM 3-24 provides useful insights into how 
counterinsurgency operations should be conducted based on recent experiences of the 
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military.  Although these imperatives can be read as being specific to the tactical level or 
level of execution, they are most applicable as a framework for the operational level of a 
counterinsurgency.  They can help explain how actions on the ground should proceed to 
accomplish the goals set forth in the operational design.   
The imperatives section in FM 3-24 describes counterinsurgency operations as:  
1) the need to use measured force; 2) empower the lowest levels; 3) learn and adapt; 4) 
support the host nation; and 5) manage expectations.  All of these imperatives can 
influence tactical operations: e.g., operations undertaken by platoons and companies and 
those responsible for managing multiple tactical elements at the battalion level and 
above.  These imperatives can be best used by those who are responsible for managing 
multiple tactical elements because they must create the conditions that will enable overall 
success.  These imperatives also can be read as warnings to mid-level tactical 
commanders because they constitute the basis of the most common mistakes made in past 
conflicts. 
3. Kilcullen’s 28 Articles (Appendix A of FM 3-24) 
This section is based on David Kilcullen’s, 28 Articles, Fundamentals of 
Company-level Counterinsurgency.18  These articles are unique in that they provide a 
specific “how to guide” to conduct a counterinsurgency.  A problem with most 
counterinsurgency theory and doctrine is that it is written in such a way that makes it 
difficult to apply at the tactical level. The ultimate success of a counterinsurgency 
strategy rests with the local environment and population.  Most theory captures this 
aspect of counterinsurgency, but fails to offer techniques that can be used by practitioners 
in the field.  Kilcullen’s work, however, provides time-phased advice on the conduct of 
counterinsurgency that begins with train-up of an element through the completion of a 
tour. 
 For the training period, there is specific direction on how to physically and 
mentally prepare a unit for the unique challenges of a counterinsurgency.  Emphasis is 
placed on matching appropriate skill sets to positions.  Kilcullen identifies the need to 
                                                 
18 Kilcullen, 1-11. 
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understand the environment, the need for adaptability in solving complex problems, and 
the inevitability that true solutions to problems will be discovered at the lowest levels of 
command.   
 Kilcullen reinforces the need for restraint and appropriate calculation in 
understanding events as they happen.  This is a challenge to tactical leaders and soldiers 
in general because most are trained to react quickly and with little thought by using a pre-
designed method (SOPs and battle drills).  For the counterinsurgent to be effective they 
must not only understand the environment and enemy they are fighting but also 
understand the likely scenarios they will face.  The distinctive nature of 
counterinsurgency is that, unlike maneuver warfare, the correct action to take is not 
always readily apparent and far more aspects of an environment and situation must be 
considered.  Furthermore, the situation where a junior leader (team leader to platoon 
leader) will have to make a decision that could have strategic implications is much more 
likely than in maneuver warfare.  For these reasons, the counterinsurgent must have a true 
understanding of whom, how, and why the enemy is fighting to identify the best counter-
actions to achieve the initiative in battle. 
 The specific recommendations identified in the execution section of 28 Articles 
are: (1) avoid knee jerk reactions, (2) prepare for handover from day one, (3) build 
trusted networks, (4) start easy, (5) seek early victories, (6) be prepared for setbacks, (7) 
remember the global audience, (8) engage the women, (9) beware the children, (10) 
exploit a single narrative, (11) local forces should mirror the enemy not ourselves, (12) 
practice armed civil affairs, (13) small is beautiful, (14) fight the enemy’s strategy not his 
forces, and (15) build your own solutions.  These all help to construct a useful way for 
U.S. forces to understand the context of their strengths and weaknesses as well as the 
enemy’s strengths and weaknesses.  Furthermore, they provide a useful picture of how 
operations will occur in a counterinsurgency. 
B. CENTRAL THEMES OF COIN 
The successful execution of tactics can be grouped into three categories of 
analysis:  1) evaluation of the counterinsurgent; 2) evaluation of the enemy; and 3) 
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evaluation of the nature of the likely conflict.  As Sun Tzu provided, “know the enemy 
and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”19  This phrase does 
not capture the essence of how the nature of a conflict might impact the tactics or 
methods employed in battle.  Sun Tzu also advised that, “what is of supreme importance 
in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”20  Clausewitz provided, “ Now, the first, the 
grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman and General exercise is 
rightly to understand in this respect the War in which he engages, not to take it for 
something, or wish to make of it something, which by the nature of its relations it is 
impossible for it to be.”21  Thus, victory in a conflict requires properly understanding 
yourself, your enemy, and the fight you will encounter. 
 In light of these timeless directives concerning victory in war, this study has 
identified four central themes of a counterinsurgency: theme #1, unity of effort and 
clarity of purpose are essential in a counterinsurgency; theme #2, the counterinsurgent 
must fight the enemy’s ideology and methods, not the enemy directly; theme #3, The 
counterinsurgent has to foster the legitimacy of the local government; and theme #4 all 
concerned need to recognize that counterinsurgency takes time and requires adaptability 
for success.    
1. Theme #1 
Unity of effort and clarity of purpose are essential in a counterinsurgency.  
Counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the statesman and the military commander must 
be united in their vision of success.22  Recognizing that military success will merely set 
the stage for political success, military and political leaders of the counterinsurgency and 
the host-nation government must have clarity of motivation and purpose to align political 
programs with the tactical methods employed to achieve them.  Additionally, unifying 
                                                 
19 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 84. 
20 Sun Tzu, 77. 
21 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (London: Penguin Books, 1968), 121. 
22 Galula, 61-63. 
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doctrine must exist and be known by all practitioners of a counterinsurgency.  Without 
clarity of purpose and method, confusion and failure are certain.  
Being able to apply one’s assets is central to success in any managerial endeavor.  
It is not unique to the military nor is it unique within a counterinsurgency.  Debate exists 
within military circles over to what degree counterinsurgency warfare differs from high-
intensity conflict or maneuver warfare.  The exact nature of the debate currently identifies 
counterinsurgency as one variation of Full-Spectrum Operations.23  Full-Spectrum 
Operations is the Army’s doctrinal definition of how the Army fights or the form it will 
take and tactics used.  Counterinsurgency is then a variation that combines offensive, 
defensive, stability, or support in unique ways, depending on the local conditions and 
parameters of success.24  Although FM 3-24, in addition to other Army manuals, names 
counterinsurgency as a subset variation of Full Spectrum Operations, it has deemed it 
necessary to define it on its own and thus a manual has been dedicated to understanding 
and executing it effectively.  Debate also exists as to whether or not the same individual 
leaders who have demonstrated success in maneuver warfare also can be successful in a 
counterinsurgency.  Most believe that with defined training, a good leader and unit can be 
effective in either conflict environment.  All agree that successful execution of a 
counterinsurgency requires effective leaders and units that have been trained to operate in 
that specific environment.  Furthermore, operating effectively in a counterinsurgency is 
not a core proficiency that the Army has developed and sustained over the years.  On the 
contrary, it has actively fought against incorporating the mission of stability operations 
into the Army core missions.25 
 All doctrine recognizes that economic and political developments are the ultimate 
metrics of success in a counterinsurgency.26  Security just sets the conditions for success 
to occur.  Whether it is the statesman, military leader, or host-government official who is 
                                                 
23  FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 34. 
24 Field Manual 3.0, Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington D.C., June 2001, 
150. 
25 Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), 17. 
26 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 272. 
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administrating these functions, they must perform as an extension of a unified plan and 
effort.  It is readily accepted that counterinsurgent forces will have to shoulder the burden 
of initiating and setting the stage for economic and political programs.  There is 
disagreement at what point and what are the events or triggers that signal the transition to 
a host-government.  Additionally, there is no consensus as to what level of management 
should hold the “purse strings” when it comes to providing money at the local level.  This 
creates a problem for defining success for military units and in assigning assets to the 
appropriate organizations to use them.  If done incorrectly or inefficiently, the benefits of 
having a large amount of capital and capability are not realized in the conflict.27   
2. Theme #2 
The counterinsurgent must fight the enemy’s ideology and methods, not the 
enemy directly. Unlike warfare between two conventional armies, an insurgency is a 
method that is used by an opponent that recognizes it cannot defeat the 
counterinsurgent’s force in a straight up fight.  As Kilcullen states, “you (the 
counterinsurgent) are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat 
anything weaker than you.”28  As a result, the insurgent will choose a method of conflict 
meant to weaken the larger and more capable force over a long period of time.  The 
insurgent maintains the initiative in a conflict by sustaining support for its cause from the 
local population.  Furthermore, insurgents typically have a clearer picture of how their 
opponents are organized and operate; conventional militaries tend to dismiss insurgents 
as undisciplined amateurs.   
A central theme repeated in counterinsurgency theory and doctrine is the idea that 
insurgents will hide in plain sight.  The insurgents do not have to operate from remote 
locations if they can gain at least the acquiescence, or even better, the support of a local 
population.  The insurgent maintains this support by undercutting the legitimacy of the 
local government, the counterinsurgent force, or both.  In addition, the insurgent’s central 
                                                 
27 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, (New York: 
Perseus Books Group, 2002), 332. 
28 Kilcullen, 1. 
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aim is to use the counterinsurgent’s actions against the local government.  Over-reaction, 
aggressive actions, and collateral damage to local populations are the principle responses 
the insurgent attempts to provoke from the counterinsurgent. 
Fighting a counterinsurgency is not akin to maneuver warfare.  You cannot 
primarily focus on the destruction or elimination of the enemy elements as in maneuver 
warfare.  The counterinsurgent will not have a military decisive target to strike to achieve 
its objective.  Additionally, organizing a military unit to maximize fighting insurgent 
forces will hinder interaction with local populations.  All of these aspects of a 
counterinsurgency support the idea that the counterinsurgent must be organized and 
operate in a manner distinctly different from maneuver warfare.  Individual soldiers must 
have a greater understanding of the culture and language to operate in a 
counterinsurgency versus maneuver warfare. Initial responses by individual soldiers, are 
critical in effecting the terms of achieving success.  Counterinsurgency operations must 
be restrained in their conduct and perception by local populations.  Therefore, to 
reinforce the correct initial response requires specific training as it differs greatly from 
maneuver warfare training that would reinforce a more aggressive approach.  
The greatest enemy of success in a counterinsurgency will be time.  There is a 
finite amount of time counterinsurgency operations have to facilitate their long-term 
legitimacy.  This affects the counterinsurgent in two ways: (1) time constraints limit the 
number of tasks that can be accomplished; and 2) without improvement, the opinion will 
turn against the counterinsurgent.  As General Petraeus notes, there is only so long that a 
counterinsurgent can operate before an army of liberation turns into an army of 
occupation.29 Many factors coalesce to create this negative turn in public opinion: the 
international media, political pressures from the counterinsurgent’s home nation, and the 
activities of the insurgent.   The best way for a unit to control negative local opinion is to 
transfer responsibilities and functions to a functioning local government.   
Officers must understand who has influence in each area while visualizing how 
these individuals shape the overall situation.  U.S. personnel must listen to and be willing 
                                                 
29 Lt. Gen David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq, 
Military Review 4 (January-February 2006), 2-12. 
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to react to the needs and wants of the local population.  To understand the local 
perspective, officers have to be engaged with all aspects of a society and be open to 
various networks of influence. 
3. Theme #3 
Legitimacy is the most important factor in a counterinsurgency.  FM 3-24 states 
that, “all governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion.”30  The less 
legitimate a regime, the more it must rely on coercive measures to maintain control.   
Counterinsurgency operations or the local government can rely on intimidation 
(coercion) to achieve its goals for a short time.  If coercion is used as the primary 
instrument then the host government and its outside supporters will be viewed as an 
oppressive (illegitimate) regime by the local population.  U.S. forces must bolster the 
legitimacy of the host government. The goals of the host government and its outside 
supporters must be transparent and acceptable to the population.  If measures taken by the 
counterinsurgent are interpreted as self-serving, unnecessary, or out of touch with the 
interests of the population as a whole, then the government is likely to be perceived as ill-
legitimate.  If legitimacy is never attained by a government, then it can never operate as 
an independent entity. 
4. Theme #4 
The U.S. government and military must have a long-term commitment and the 
U.S. military must be prepared to adapt to local conditions of the counterinsurgency if it 
is to succeed.  Doctrine supports the idea that insurgencies can last a long time.  They 
cannot be defeated quickly because they generally are supported by some segment of the 
local population.31  This tenet is both a warning and planning guide for tactical 
commanders.  Given the fact that the U.S. rotates its forces, every commander must 
understand their contribution to a counterinsurgency will be limited and should add to a 
                                                 
30 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 37. 
31 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency in the Modern World, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1980), 
26. 
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long-term plan.  This idea runs contrary to many aspects of the U.S. Army’s approach to 
warfare and operations in general.   
Adaptability facilitates long-term engagement because circumstances will change 
over time. Every counterinsurgency will differ in some ways and a single method will 
never remain effective even if initially successful. Insurgents will adapt to the tactics 
employed by friendly forces.  Because rapid change is not possible or effective for the 
Army as a whole, adapting to the enemy and the environment must be promoted and 
supported at the lowest level possible.  In the case of Iraq, the company level would be 
the most appropriate because commanders at this level enjoy some current experience but 
remain on a specific task. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Current counterinsurgency doctrine has existed for over 40 years.  Although the 
nature of insurgencies and warfare has grown increasingly more complicated, the way to 
conduct counterinsurgency operations and, more importantly, the tenets or “way to think” 
behind the tactics has remained largely consistent.  FM 3-24 is a valuable guide for the 
counterinsurgent at the tactical level because it incorporates the best of counterinsurgency 
theory with the best known methods for practical application.  FM 3-24 gives specific 
insight into the tenets and best practices of tactical level execution of counterinsurgency 
doctrine.  Furthermore, applying this theory with earlier tenets of success in warfare 
presents a new construct for visualizing success in warfare: Victory in a conflict requires 
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III. FIGHTING THE WAR WE GOT, NOT THE ONE WE 
WANTED 
A. DESCRIBING U.S. STRATEGY IN 2004-2005 
This chapter identifies the strategy used by the U.S. Army in Iraq in 2004-2005.  
Specifically, the chapter recounts the strategy that guided one U.S. Army unit through its 
training and deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  The experience of this unit 
was likely typical of other Army units.  This approach can identify specific issues for 
analysis.  What follows is this author’s perception, as a Company Commander, of the 
doctrine and strategy that our unit employed in Iraq which is probably representative of 
other Army units at this time. 
This chapter begins with a brief narrative containing significant events that 
occurred on my arrival to the 1-87 Infantry up to and including the early period of 
deployment to OIF and it will begin to explain why my unit’s strategy could be better 
described as a counter-terror strategy rather than a counterinsurgent strategy.  It will then 
identify the four factors that lead the Army to select a counter-terror strategy.  Then it 
will describe in detail what a counter-terror strategy is at the tactical level of execution.  
Lastly, this chapter will identify three factors that contributed to the 1-87’s inability to 
adapt its strategy after beginning combat operations.   
 
1. Narrative of 1-87 Infantry Prior to OIF 
The purpose of this section is to provide some level of context for the reader to 
understand the environment in which the strategy and training was being formed for 
1-87’s deployment to OIF and to substantiate some conclusions about what Army 
doctrine was at this time.  The tactics, strategy, and planning for operations in combat 
can, in some respects, be considered the easy part of warfare; it’s the myriad of 
competing priorities and events that often present the toughest challenge to leaders in 
performing effectively.   
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I arrived at 1-87 Infantry, 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, in June 2004 after 
assignment to a staff position in the 1 Brigade S3 (operations).  The 1st Brigade, including 
1-87, was just returning from a one year deployment to Afghanistan as part of Operation 
Enduring Freedom IV.  During Operation Enduring Freedom, the brigade had been 
successful and 1-87 had received significant exposure to conducting unconventional 
operations. Each of its three rifle companies had been assigned to different small outposts 
along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.  Much of their operations were geared towards 
battling different insurgent groups while attempting to revitalize commerce and normal 
activities in the local towns.  In comparison to most units in Iraq, the casualties had been 
less but 1-87 had three combat deaths during the deployment. 
Battalion leadership believed they had conducted an effective counterinsurgency 
campaign and much effort was spent in identifying and understanding the best practices 
that evolved.  In hind sight, however, this campaign was clearly more focused on 
defeating the terrorist influence in Afghanistan rather than defeating the growing 
insurgency.  Therefore many of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and strategies that 
were employed were incorrectly assumed to be transferable from Afghanistan to Iraq. 
For example, the tactic of having units live on large forward operating bases 
rather than disperse into communities was largely established in Afghanistan but was 
necessary in this operation due to the size of the assigned area of operation in relation to 
the amount of troops assigned to it and means of transportation.  It was not possible in 
Operation Enduring Freedom to have soldiers live in communities as they needed to 
constantly be on the move to cover a larger area of operations.   
The Brigade returned to Fort Drum, New York in May 2004, at that point it began 
immediately to execute its transformation into a new Unit of Action.  I took command of 
the Headquarters Company 1-87 Infantry, joining two other new Company Commanders 
for the battalion, who had taken command of their rifle companies a few months before 
redeploying from Afghanistan.   
The transformation was a complete overhaul of the typical structure of the unit by 
attempting to create organic relationships by attaching multiple types of units that usually 
only existed in a war time or training mission.  That is, each battalion would have a 
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Forward Support Company, which included higher level supply, maintenance, and 
transportation assets and functions.  These assets were previously only available at the 
brigade or higher levels.  Now they would be permanently assigned at brigade and 
battalion levels.  The most drastic change, at the battalion level, was the addition of two 
new companies, a Delta or anti-armor company and the Forward Support Company.  The 
new configuration would also significantly change the structure of the Headquarters 
Company of each battalion, as it would now lose its Support Platoon, Anti-Tank Platoon, 
and all other support positions that better meshed with the FSB; i.e. cooks.  These 
structural changes altered the Mission Essential Task List. Additionally, guidance from 
Division and higher levels was being pushed to mesh low-intensity conflict type missions 
and lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan with our traditional Task Lists. 
The end result was a brigade completely turned up side down from its traditional 
operating structure, doctrinal understanding, and habitual relationships.  Leaders at all 
levels also recognized that current doctrine guiding combat operations did not account for 
the type of operations that were occurring, namely a counterinsurgency operation.  There 
was disagreement regarding what the unit and the Mission Essential Task List should 
look like as a finished product to account for this change of structure and tasks.  
Therefore, many changes enacted and tactics, techniques, and procedures enforced were a 
kind of shot gun blast of ideas hoping that at least one pellet would hit the mark.  We 
knew we needed to change; we just were not sure exactly who should do it and how it 
should be done.  With unsure, conflicting, or non-existent specified guidance coming 
from higher authority, the phrase of the day became “parallel planning.”32  Lower level 
units continued planning and executing implied tasks without being specifically told to do 
so from higher command; this process assumes there is a clear goal or end-state 
established and all units are clear on the expected method to achieve it.   
These two assumptions were completely inaccurate.  We were not sure of our 
focus, we didn’t have the equipment to do what we thought we would likely be asked to 
do, and we knew our training may not be adequate to conduct the missions asked of us.  
                                                 
32 Field Manual 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company, Headquarters Department of the Army, 
Washington D.C., July 2006, 2-4. 
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Therefore, each battalion level unit took the guidance from higher command and did their 
best to structure their unit and train what they thought they would have to do. 
The four most influential positions in a battalion, is the Commander, Command 
Sergeant Major, Executive Officer, and Operations Officer.  The next most influential 
positions are the Company Commanders.  For the deployment to Operation Enduring 
Freedom IV, 1-87 Infantry had the same Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant 
Major who had taken command shortly before the deployment of the unit to Afghanistan.  
They remained in place throughout transformation and train-up for the deployment to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom III.  Two Company Commanders had taken command of rifle 
companies in the last couple of months of Operation Enduring Freedom IV.  The 
Battalion Executive Officer and Operations Officer both left the Battalion upon return 
from Afghanistan.  Also, just after redeployment of the Battalion, three new Company 
Commanders took command of the remaining companies within the Battalion; I was one 
of those Commanders.  At the beginning of transformation and preparation for a future 
deployment to Iraq, 1-87 had a seasoned Commander and Command Sergeant Major with 
newly assigned personnel as the Battalion Executive Officer, Operations, and all 
Company Commander positions. 
The effect of “fresh blood” combined with a good tactical understanding, from the 
top, of how to be effective in unconventional conflict was particularly useful.  1-87 was 
able to focus on the areas we needed to adapt to these new tasks and structure.  
Furthermore, we were receiving almost instantaneous information from the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan on effective tactics and techniques to utilize and train.  The problems 
encountered were one of context.  Sometimes we would receive conflicting techniques or 
information from different areas of operations and without a personal understanding of 
the conflict or the place it had occurred, it was difficult to decide what tactics, techniques, 
and procedures would or would not be effective.  This conflicted with most leaders’ 
typical method to prepare for a mission, which is to rely on known doctrine and an 
established context in which to understand military influence on a given conflict.  But 
what happens if leaders can only decide what the ultimate end result should be but have 
no real idea of how to achieve it.  Especially if one knows you don’t have the assets or 
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personnel to do what’s being asked or your commander believes whole heartedly in an 
inappropriate method (thus not giving a clear commander’s intent)?  This was often the 
“sense” of the situation from lower levels of command.   
The reaction of Company Commanders was to concentrate more effort at the 
lowest levels of execution, focusing more on individual training that would support any 
course of action.   This included marksmanship training, equipment training, vehicle 
training, language and cultural training, and any others that could ultimately prove 
beneficial in multiple combat environments.  The problem then became one of resources 
and time available.  We did not receive most of our major weapons systems and vehicles 
until the week before we began to patrol and there was an inadequate number of heavy 
machine guns and vehicles to use to train and prepare for our upcoming mission.  
Additionally, many leaders recognized the need for greater understanding of tasks such as 
language training and cultural awareness.  The resources to support this training were not 
readily available for many units.  The amount of tasks compared to the time available to 
train them and the ability of an average soldier to retain the new knowledge became 
highly unrealistic.  Furthermore, many tasks were not practiced to a level of proficiency 
that would facilitate their successful performance in combat. 
Although there were many challenges, 1-87 did everything possible to overcome 
them.  To facilitate training unit’s used simulators or contacted other units to address 
weapon shortfalls.  We conducted vehicle training, but there was no way to replicate the 
difference between the way a regular HMWWV and an Up-Armored vehicle handles.  
We ultimately accomplished a limited and largely insufficient amount of training on Up-
Armored vehicles in Kuwait.  In addition, new systems were constantly being issued to 
units.  As a result, soldiers and leaders knew they would be using unfamiliar systems 
once in Iraq.  Most units did not go to Iraq during this period with full operational 
knowledge or expert competence in all the equipment and critical tasks they would need 
in combat. 
1-87 addressed these shortfalls through focused training at the individual, squad, 
and platoon levels.  Although this followed the normal flow of training typical of a light 
infantry unit (individual training, then squad exercises, culminating in a platoon live fire 
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exercise) it was supplemented with a training period in Florida in which the Battalion was 
able to provide an additional training set for every organic weapon system.  It also 
provided a useful and focused training area to facilitate company exercises, which 
addressed company counterinsurgency tasks.  The overall focus of every squad, platoon, 
and company training exercise was on counterinsurgency specific scenarios.  Extra effort 
went into creating the most realistic and challenging environment as possible.  In 
hindsight, it is very difficult to provide realistic training for an urban counterinsurgency 
environment.  Without training in an area that looks, smells, sounds, and is populated like 
Baghdad, it is difficult to replicate the conditions that would be encountered. 
Although we attempted to replicate combat conditions and create scenarios we 
believed would be encountered in Iraq, what actually occurred was that the tasks, 
conditions, and scenarios experienced in Afghanistan were replicated and reinforced.  
Some of this was good: focusing on vehicle movement techniques that were largely 
unfamiliar to tactical units; reinforcing tactical restraint when dealing with non-
combatants; and exposure to improvised explosive device explosions before having to 
face them in combat.  Where we were deficient, however, was that we were solely 
focused on the enemy.  All scenarios were centered on finding the “bad guys” and 
culminated in notionally eliminating said “bad guy,” thus the counterinsurgent wins.  
Although some scenarios focused on pacification or engaging of local leaders, success 
involved obtaining information from them not finding solutions to their problems.  Even 
though our main mantra at this time was winning the hearts and minds of the people, we 
believed we would accomplish that by killing the “bad guys” and providing enough 
support to the locals to keep them quiet and out of our way. 
1-87 culminated its training in March 2005 with a rotation to the Joint Readiness 
Training Center (JRTC).  We trained hard for a year, successfully transformed into a Unit 
of Action, and had made great strides in the overall capabilities of every level of the 
Battalion.  The result was that 1-87 was successful in its mission readiness exercise 
(MRE) at JRTC. 
Keeping in mind this is supposed to be the final check on a unit being ready to 
deploy to combat, it was deemed appropriate to change most of the key leaders of the 
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Battalion and multiple companies following our MRE.  Two Company Commanders 
were identified as needing to be replaced (both were replaced with barely one year of 
command, which was unusual and attributed to the Brigade Commander not having faith 
in their abilities to lead in combat), A Company (which I took command of), D Company, 
and Headquarters Company (which I relinquished command of).  Also, the Battalion 
Commander and Command Sergeant Major left the Battalion, the Executive Officer was 
reassigned as the Operations Officer, and a new Executive Officer was assigned.  These 
changes occurred April-June 2005 and our Battalion would deploy to Iraq in less than six 
weeks.  The only training events conducted after all of the changes were a brigade level 
Theater Specific Individual Readiness Tasks (TSIRT) which revalidated all the individual 
tasks that were deemed essential to all soldiers in Iraq, and a short training period in 
Kuwait.  These leadership changes can only be understood if professional development of 
individual leaders is paramount over unit success.  One could justify changing one or two 
of the most influential leaders in a Battalion but virtually all of them; unless it was a 
poorly performing unit (1-87 had turned in a fine performance at JRTC). 
A Company (prior to my arrival) had garnered a bad reputation due to its poor 
performance, which was largely attributed to poor leadership at the company level.  The 
next time we would be able to accomplish any type of training and to focus on identified 
shortcomings and untrained systems was in Kuwait.  In Kuwait, we had approximately 
two weeks to conduct a myriad of training on many of the newly assigned systems and 
vehicles, and finish any needed weapons training.  The real purpose of the training was to 
allow soldiers to ease into the environment in which they would be operating for the next 
year (getting used to 100-110 degrees in 60 lbs of gear does not happen overnight).  
Weather conditions and intense heat during the day limited the amount of training 
conducted, but we managed to get to the range a couple of times to train on the heavy 
weapons and were able to utilize several mock up villages and training areas to hone our 
offensive urban operation skills.  We also pushed the familiarization of 10 basic phrases 
in Iraqi Arabic for every soldier.  These included basic greetings and commands utilized 
while detaining an individual. 
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At the company level we also had many leadership changes just prior to 
deploying.  One Platoon Sergeant, two Platoon Leaders, and my Executive Officer were 
replaced.  After observing training, I decided that one of the platoon leaders would have 
to be replaced as well.  I had the support of the new Battalion Commander and he was 
changed out with a Lieutenant in the S3 shop.   
After our two weeks of training in Kuwait, 1-87 began to be moved into Iraq.  We 
flew straight into Baghdad at Camp Liberty and began a 10-day period of what is called 
left seat right seat rides.  Basically, this is a relief in place of another similar sized unit in 
our new area of operations.  Also during this transition, units exchanged necessary 
equipment and move into living quarters and offices.   
 Several observations can be made about 1-87’s preparations for the war.  1) Units 
were being asked to make significant structural and doctrinal changes in the short time 
between combat deployments.  2) Minimal guidance was being provided from higher 
authorities to guide training and transformation at the unit level.  In most cases, the Army 
had an idea of what capabilities it wanted units to be able to bring to a fight but did not 
have a clear way of accomplishing the changes necessary.  3) Tactical successes were 
being taken straight from combat and applied to training units.  While this is good in 
some instances, it can be detrimental if the context of the successful doctrine is not 
understood.  4) Success in operations was defined in terms of identifying and eliminating 
the terrorist threat.  The focus of training and doctrine was on offensive tactics to 
eliminate a known and identified enemy element.  This is evident in the selection of task 
priority from brigade and division commanders.  At this time, the unit’s focus was on the 
offensive skills such as weapons training and small unit offensive tactics that enabled the 
destruction of the enemy.  5) Understanding the culture and local conditions were not as 
important as understanding how the enemy conducted operations.  Cultural awareness, 
language training, and counterinsurgency tactics were all in their infancy for the 
conventional Army.  As a result, they were not universally embraced as necessary to 
success on the battlefield.  They did not receive the resources and priority they deserved.  
6) There was a lack of a universally understood view or common operating picture of the 
situation in Iraq.  Most units assumed that they would obtain a clearer picture of the local 
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and enemy situation from the outgoing units and from higher level intelligence sources.  
This did not happen.  Most leaders could see that the military as a whole was having 
uneven success in Iraq, however, the reasons for this lack of progress often centered on 
number of troops available rather than on the tactics being utilized.  Additionally, since 
knowledge of culture and population is not critical to performing solely offensive 
operations, tactical leaders struggled to gain a clear picture of the culture and context of 
the conflict.  7)  Transforming the way leaders think of warfare was not a primary focus.  
Though recognized as the hardest and most important aspect of Transformation of the 
Army,33 the transformation of leaders’ thinking received little instruction.   
 B. WHAT FACTORS IMPACTED THE CHOICE OF STRATEGY 
SELECTED? 
 While this study cannot specifically refer the reader to what the Army’s doctrine 
was at this time (since it didn’t exist and there was not consensus by all units), I can 
establish what some of the central themes of our training and strategy were.  So if the 
Army did not embrace a counterinsurgency strategy how do we characterize what the 
strategy was?  Based on the nature of tactics and methods selected by the Army at this 
time, the strategy we ultimately came to use could be better described as a counter-terror 
campaign.  This section will specifically identify the contributing factors to the 
development of our strategy and define what counter-terror tactics are at the tactical level 
in order to facilitate a framework for analysis against what we now know of 
counterinsurgency.  The reason a counter-terror campaign was inappropriate will be 
described and brought out in detail in Chapter 4. 
The best way to describe Army counterinsurgency doctrine, in 2004, is to say that 
it lacked a unified doctrine.  There was a lack of consensus among units at all levels from 
company to brigade on exactly the type of strategy to be employed in Iraq.  Additionally, 
there was no universal understanding of how tactical success would translate into 
operational and strategic success; therefore there was no unified approach to how to win 
                                                 
33 Steven M. Jones, “Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic 
Imperative,” Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy (September 2003): 1. 
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in Iraq.  At the division level, the choice of strategy was dependant on the specific region 
but again was not uniform throughout Iraq.34  The most significant problem was that 
commanders at all levels had not had the education or exposure to understand 
counterinsurgency doctrine and how it differed in approach from traditional doctrine.  
Therefore, units going to Iraq believed that they were training for and conducting a 
counterinsurgency but many units’ actions were more related to a counter-terror 
campaign.  Since many units were actually conducting a counter-terror campaign, their 
actions violated many of the tenets of a counterinsurgency or could be characterized as 
unsuccessful or inappropriate practices. 
The strategy of 2004-2005 consisted of finding and eliminating the enemy to win 
the hearts and minds of the local population.  All U.S. forces needed to do was kill or 
capture the enemy.  Therefore, all actions at the Battalion level and below were oriented 
towards this aim in a fashion that provided the greatest security or safety to friendly units.  
This reinforced the belief that U.S. forces could remain on large forward operating bases 
and commute to their assigned area of operation.  This promoted both aims of 
concentrating forces for offensive actions while providing the maximum protection to 
friendly forces and limiting exposure to possible enemy interaction. 
1. Contributing Factors to the Army’s Strategy in 2004-2005 
The following section identifies four factors contributing to the selection of a 
counter-terror strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom III by the Army.  They are: (1) The 
Army, as an organization, was slow to accept that part of the problem was our lack of 
appropriate doctrine; (2) The method of choice for the Army is traditionally offensive in 
nature; (3) The Forward Operating Base mindset was already SOP; (4) Poor personnel 
management of tactical level leaders. 
                                                 
34 Note the differences in approach as noted in Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: 
The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006) 447., between 
the Marines and the 4th ID.  It is a premise of this study that this was not a unique scenario. 
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a. Factor 1  
 The Army, as an organization, was slow to accept that part of the problem 
was our lack of appropriate doctrine.  Specific doctrine and written tactical guidance, for 
counterinsurgency, did not exist and the guidance that existed was inconsistent with 
accepted counterinsurgency theory.  Most leaders acknowledged that traditional doctrine 
did not apply to the war in Iraq; however, most believed that our current skill set and 
traditional doctrine could be adapted to achieve success.  Due to rapid changes in 
organizational structure, units began to develop individual strategies and tactics to 
accomplish assigned missions.  This “parallel planning” at unit level caused many units 
to plan and train in ways inconsistent with appropriate counterinsurgency strategy.  
Additionally, higher level commanders provided minimal guidance in how to structurally 
and doctrinally rectify inconsistencies. And when they did, it was all encompassing and 
often didn’t account for individual circumstances or local enemy situations.  This 
prompted random guidance being given that didn’t have universal applicability in every 
area of operations; however, universal adherence to guidance was mandated.  Often, units 
would maintain tactics, techniques, and procedures, and adhere to standard operating 
procedures even when it was detrimental to operations. 
  Overall this “parallel planning” effect, combined with a lack of unifying 
theory and doctrine, promoted multiple approaches to the same problem set in Iraq.  With 
every unit operating on different principles the efforts of multiple units could not be 
unified under a single operational design in Iraq.  This lack of unity hindered a common 
operating picture of the operation and hindered tactical commanders from identifying 
appropriate measures of effectiveness.  Often Brigade and Battalion Commanders would 
utilize measures of effectiveness that had minimal impact on the long-term success of an 
operation, such as the number of killed and captured enemy.  When inappropriate 
measures of effectiveness become the goals of lower level units it is usually at the 
expense of the higher commander’s own desired end-state and counter-productive to the 
success of the operation.   
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b. Factor 2   
 The method of choice for the Army is traditionally offensive in nature.  At 
the tactical level, the U.S. Army consistently defines the solutions to all problems within 
the context of an offensive mind set or tactic, even if theory and practice argue that other 
tactics would be more appropriate.  This bias contributed to a failure to realize that using 
too much force hinders the gaining of cooperation at the local level.  Although restraint in 
a counterinsurgency environment is appropriate, units often leaned towards aggression.  
The aggressive approach also was the method that was most supported by Battalion and 
Brigade Commanders. 
c.  Factor 3   
 The Forward Operating Base mindset was already the standard operating 
procedure.  The principle that U.S. forces would base their operations out of large bases 
such as Camp Liberty and basically commute to work each day was well established.  At 
the unit level, we never really considered the utility of being based in the neighborhoods.  
The utility of how units are based was not discussed as part of our training.  The first time 
the topic was raised was around two months into our tour when a number of Battalion 
and Company level leaders were advocating the use of smaller bases situated closer to or 
within their areas of operation.  This was not seriously entertained as an option, in 
Baghdad, due to security concerns.   
d.  Factor 4   
 Poor personnel management of tactical level leaders was an issue.  
Personnel were moved without regard to the impact on unit effectiveness.  Effective 
leaders were not always left in place and ineffective leaders were not always replaced in a 
timely manner.  Mid-level managers were placing more importance on administrative 
“box checking” than on ensuring that commanders with proven ability in a 
counterinsurgency were put and left in charge of tactical units.  Although battalion and 
brigade commanders were attached to the unit for the duration of a deployment, many 
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units prior to the “life cycle”35 system had lower level leaders moved just prior to or 
during deployments.  This does not comply with the idea that the most crucial decision 
makers are at the lowest levels, company and platoon, and not all leaders will be effective 
at executing counterinsurgency operations.   
 The long-term health of Army units requires leaders to be rotated routinely 
to ensure that they receive the appropriate experience.  Evidence in this study 
demonstrates, however, that leaders at all levels were moved or replaced for reasons other 
than mission effectiveness.  Additionally, higher level leaders may have been reluctant to 
attempt more complex or different strategies with less experienced leaders.  Most 
commanders, at this point in Iraq, were in their first rotation.  Therefore few leaders had 
hands on experience with executing counterinsurgency doctrine. 
  Due to the four factors named above, the choice to embrace an offensive 
strategy, which was counterinsurgency in name only, was inevitable.  Because 
counterinsurgency strategy was a relatively new experience to most leaders there was not 
universal understanding or application of it.  Therefore the unity of effort that is essential 
to ensure success was nonexistent.  Furthermore, U.S. forces prefer to conduct familiar 
operations utilizing familiar methods, such as large forward operating bases.  The 
strategy and campaign plan that was enacted in 2004-2005 cannot be described as a 
counterinsurgency operation.  The strategy employed by U.S. forces was not consistent 
and the strategy of many Army units at this time can more accurately be described as a 
counter-terror campaign. 
C. COUNTER-TERROR CAMPAIGN 
 A counter-terror strategy, at its core, can be attributed to the level of acceptance 
that military and political leaders have given the Powell Doctrine since its validation 
following the first Gulf War.  According to Max Boot, Powell Doctrine identified several 
extreme preconditions that must be met before commitment of U.S. forces, “which grew 
                                                 
35 This is in reference to the new system of applying a three year time frame to units.  The first year all 
new personnel arrive to the unit, they receive appropriate equipment, and begin training, the second year 
training culminate, the last year and a half is available for deployment.  All personnel are stabilized in the 
unit for the entire three year period. 
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out of the debacle of Vietnam and was nourished by the military’s traditional distaste for 
small wars, has come to stand for an all-or-nothing approach to warfare, with the ideal 
war being one in which the U.S. wins with overwhelming force, suffers few casualties, 
and leaves immediately.  This has become conventional wisdom in some corners."36  
Thus, how does the United States apply military force to accomplish foreign interests if it 
can’t meet all of these criteria?  The answer is small scale operations executed by 
specially trained units for very quick operations.  This works for small, highly trained 
units, but does it work to take the successful strategies of these units and try to apply 
them to large, conventional units?   
Defining what a counter-terror campaign is at the brigade level and below is 
somewhat challenging because most literature analyzes this type of campaign design 
from a state level.  As identified above, the traditional units to execute such strategies 
have typically been elite units, referred to as Special Operations Units.  To find the 
specific points of comparison at the tactical level this study identifies how a counter-
terror campaign would be executed by a large conventional force.  It will identify the 
main imperatives that guide the tactical execution of a counter-terror campaign. 
In a counter-terror campaign, useful, accurate, and timely intelligence about 
enemy activity is paramount to success.  Efforts are made to attain and cultivate 
intelligence utilizing all available assets.  It is assumed by tactical units, that accurate and 
timely intelligence will be provided from higher echelons to the tactical units.37 
A counter-terror campaign is threat based and does not attempt to influence the 
local populations in which it has to operate.  In fact, the approach seeks only to act 
rapidly against terrorist elements.  This approach can concentrate friendly forces on bases 
separate from the local population.  Emphasis is placed on ensuring the bases are secure 
from indigenous networks or terrorists. 
The definition of success in a counter-terror campaign is in the capture or 
destruction of a defined enemy force.  This approach utilizes the offensive force of U.S. 
                                                 
36 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, (New York: 
Perseus Books Group, 2002), 319. 
37 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 319. 
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units to overwhelm the defined enemy elements.  It ties directly into the Jominian form of 
warfare38 in bringing overwhelming force to a named decisive point to eliminate the 
enemy.  It also requires a relatively small force against most enemy elements, due to the 
disproportionate capability and lethality of the U.S. military. 
Terrorist and friendly elements are clearly defined in a counter-terror campaign, 
no neutral element exist.  Thus, anyone who fights against the counter-terror force is 
considered the enemy, is supportive of the terrorist elements, and must be eliminated.  
Counter-terror assumes that all enemy elements, and by definition terrorists, are clearly 
identified and that their motives are clearly understood as they pertain to mission success.   
Terrorist activities should be preempted because, as the counter-terrorist, you 
have superior intelligence, understand who and why the enemies is fighting, and prefer to 
engage the enemy kinetically, preempting the enemy’s activities is possible and 
preferred.  The ability to interdict the enemy’s activities also is equated to maintaining 
the initiative. 
Collateral damage is expected and does little to impact overall success and it is 
likely when the location of the kinetic action is in an urban setting.  This is acceptable if 
it results in the elimination of terrorists.  Destruction of property and the deaths of the 
local population are not important because this has little relevance to the physical 
destruction of the terrorist network.   
 Lastly, the combat phase of a counter-terror campaign is short in duration. While 
the entire involvement in a specific mission may be long-term, the combat phase or phase 
in which the counter-terrorist is physically maneuvering to eliminate the enemy element 
is short.  
D. WHY THE ARMY DID NOT ADAPT ITS DOCTRINE AFTER 
BEGINNING OPERATIONS 
 This study has established why a counter-terror strategy was initially employed by 
many units and identified the themes that would characterize a counter-terror campaign at 
the tactical level for a conventional unit.  The tenets of a counter-terror campaign 
                                                 
38 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 112. 
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contradict most of the key tenets of a counterinsurgency.  Applying a counter-terror 
strategy to a problem set that mandates a counterinsurgency strategy will not end in 
success.  The question remains: Why U.S. Army units took nearly two more years to 
recognize fully that our approach was flawed?  Three factors characterize the problems 
with our strategy following the start of combat operations.  (1) Commanders were 
reluctant to take risks to discover innovative solutions or to question inappropriate tactics.  
(2) The U.S. Army had not facilitated non- kinetic means for success at the tactical level.  
(3) Task overload was considered an element of combat rather than an element of 
leadership to be mitigated by guidance from higher commanders. 
1. Factor 1  
Commanders were reluctant to take risks to discover innovative solutions or to 
question inappropriate tactics.  This was due to a perception of acceptable methods of 
higher level commanders.  This fostered a general reluctance to accept more risk to 
capitalize on tactical gains.  Commanders were more likely to increase safety measures 
and force protection than to pursue more risky but ultimately more successful practices.  
Local opinions and lower tactical commanders were largely ignored if their ideas did not 
mesh with the preconceived notions of how operations would proceed, even more so if 
immediate successes (in Army terms usually translating into better security) were not 
achieved.  Higher level commanders often mandated cookie cutter solutions that 
disregarded the gains to be made by utilizing more effective techniques.  Company 
Commanders were sometimes slow to suggest changes to tactics, techniques, and 
procedures to address enemy tactics.  They were equally worried about how higher level 
leaders would perceive their choice of tactics.  An innovative tactic can easily be 
perceived as tactically unsound or unnecessarily risky.  Therefore, if there is no universal 
understanding of the appropriate strategy and tactics for the environment then 
understanding what is tactically sound cannot be universally understood.  Risk is often 
defined by the observer and its severity and applicability is largely in the eye of the 
beholder. 
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2.   Factor 2  
The U.S. Army had not facilitated non-kinetic means for success at the tactical 
level.  Because the Army did not do a good job of facilitating the best solutions to the 
problem set, leaders continued to pursue means that were within there known skill set and 
sphere of influence.  Even though it is known and widely accepted that the best weapons 
to win in a counterinsurgency are typically monetary based; i.e., money, contracts, and 
jobs, these “weapons” were largely unavailable to company commanders at this time.  
Without these non-kinetic means to win the favor and support of local populations, 
tactical level leaders were left to fix a situation without one of its most effective tools. 
This situation has been described as trying to turn a screw with a hammer; in Iraq at this 
time we were only considering different types or sizes of hammer in which to turn the 
screw rather than considering the use of a screwdriver. 
3.   Factor 3   
Task overload was considered an element of combat rather than an element of 
leadership to be mitigated by guidance from higher commanders.  The Army did not 
always recognize it could not accomplish everything at once.  Therefore, it was important 
that appropriate priority was given to the right activities and sequencing of tasks was 
coordinated.  This was rarely the case.  The typical experience for tactical commanders 
was to have many more tasks assigned than could realistically be completed.  This forced 
commanders to “cut corners” or find short cuts to completing tasks “just well enough” 
instead of meeting the higher commander’s overall operational intent.  Additionally, the 
Army always sided with security improvement tasks and usually would only rely on U.S. 
forces for accomplishing critical operations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This section identified four factors contributing to the selection of strategy for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom III by the Army.  They are: (1) The Army, as an organization, 
was slow to accept that part of the problem was our lack of appropriate doctrine; (2) The 
 38
method of choice for the Army is traditionally offensive in nature; (3) The Forward 
Operating Base mindset was already SOP; (4) Poor personnel management of tactical 
level leaders.  These factors lead the U.S. Army to pursue a counter-terror strategy which 
was counterproductive because it was overly focused on the destruction of the enemy and 
did not give enough regard to gaining the support of the local population, which 
ultimately proved to fuel the insurgency we were trying to eliminate. 
Additionally, this section identified three factors that characterize the problems 
with our strategy following the start of combat operations.  (1) Commanders were 
reluctant to take risks to discover innovative solutions or to question inappropriate tactics.  
(2) The U.S. Army had not facilitated non- kinetic means for success at the tactical level.  
(3) Task overload was considered an element of combat rather than an element of 
leadership to be mitigated by guidance from higher commanders.  These factors reduced 
leader’s ability to connect the right tools and techniques to the problem set and hindered 











IV. WHY OUR STRATEGY WAS WRONG 
This chapter identifies why Army use of a counter-terror strategy was ill-suited 
for the mission assigned.  This chapter begins by discussing “successful versus 
unsuccessful” strategies for a counterinsurgency.  Then will refer back to the central 
themes of a counterinsurgency established in Chapter 2 to frame the discussion and to 
provide the points of comparison of where the Army strategy went wrong.   
 
A. SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL PRACTICES  
The chart below39 is an interpretation of Kalev Sepp’s work in an article in 
Military Review, appearing in Jun 2005, titled Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.40 
The only difference between the following and Sepp’s work is the noticeable omission in 
the unsuccessful practices of, “Primacy of military direction of counter-insurgency.”  
Politics not military considerations dominate modern warfare.  Currently, it has to be a 
working assumption on the U.S. Army’s part that we are able to plan and win a 
counterinsurgency conflict, but does that mean we “should” be the lead component.  A 
recurrent theme of most counterinsurgency theorists, even old warriors, is that the 
military should not have the overall responsibility and authority for a counterinsurgency 
conflict. 
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Figure 1.  Best Practices of COIN41 
The list above is a useful transition as it highlights both the successful practices of 
a counterinsurgency and also provides the points of contention, the unsuccessful 
practices.  If an inappropriate technique is used to address a problem set, it could be 
named as unsuccessful but would largely be considered wrong for the problem set since it 
could be successful if applied to the correct problem set.   
B. THEMES OF A SUCCESSFUL COIN 
In the following section the four themes of successful counterinsurgency will be 
used as a framework for comparison with what the Army did in Iraq from 2004-2005.   
                                                 




1. Theme 1 of a Successful Counterinsurgency 
Unity of effort and clarity of purpose are essential in a counterinsurgency.  A 
universal understanding of how and what the Army was attempting to accomplish was 
not present.  For example, following the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 it was clear that a 
common approach to the problem set was not present among Division Commanders.  In 
Tikrit, when the 4th Infantry Division replaced the 1st Marine Division they deemed it 
necessary to revert to a more heavy hand following the initiation of postwar or phase four 
operations (first stages of a counterinsurgency or prevention of an insurgency).  Michael 
Gordon and General Bernard Trainor42 noted that, “a budding cooperative environment 
between citizens and American forces was quickly snuffed out” by the actions of the 4th 
ID.  One can argue which unit was right, but the point is that different commanders 
identified different solutions to the same problem set and many units selected a more 
aggressive approach.  Scenarios such as this one have been repeated time and again in 
Iraq. 
Many units throughout Iraq implemented effective counterinsurgency tactics.43  
Evidence now suggests it was at the battalion and brigade level that the lack of “getting” 
counterinsurgency occurred, but this lack of awareness was not universal among all 
Battalion and Brigade Commanders.  General Patraeus understood and employed 
counterinsurgency tactics the moment the 101st had occupied their area of operations in 
northern Iraq.  His approach fit with the best counterinsurgency practices.44  However, 
the words counterinsurgency or cultural awareness never made it into any written 
commander’s guidance provided to 1-87 prior to deploying to Iraq.45  Considering this 
was almost a year and half after the initial invasion, this shortcoming is hard to justify.  
                                                 
42 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and 
Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 447. 
43 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xv. 
44  Lt. Gen David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq, 
Military Review 4 (January-February 2006). 
45 I posit this not only as a company commander in the brigade but also as the primary staff officer 
who assisted in the publication of the 10th MTN DIV 350-1 manual, November 2003, and in the 
formulation of three iterations of the brigade commanders guidance to 1 BCT, January-May 2004.  
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The Commander’s understanding of the conflict in which he is engaging is reflected in 
the guidance he gives to his subordinate units and ultimately in the unit actions. 
 Cooperation cannot be brought about through sheer intimidation.  Gaining the 
hearts and minds of a population is when local “buy in” has been obtained.  Without local 
cooperation nothing else works and the thought that eliminating all of the “terrorists” 
would somehow create cooperation was very misguided.   
 Every counterinsurgency will differ and require adaptability and innovation at the 
lowest levels to facilitate success.  This is what some commanders did not understand 
about counterinsurgency.  Many tactics that were recommended and executed by 
company commanders were the correct tactics for the fight but were not recognized and 
explored by senior officers.  Often tactics that were not working were encouraged and the 
ones that would work were discouraged.  Tactical innovation was not rewarded, but 
rather adherence to what higher command had already decided they wanted to occur.   
  Company Commanders operated in different ways in Iraq.  1-87 replaced three 
different units during our tour in Iraq.  In each transition process, several observations 
could be made about the units we were replacing.  1)  They were executing operations 
almost exclusively by vehicle.  2)  They were highly reluctant to perform dismounted 
operations and to interact with local populations.  3) All units believed, when driving, 
that “speed” was the single most significant factor to increase safety due to the IED 
threat.  4) All units had a very poor picture of the culture, informal networks of the 
economy, and local politics.  5) Most units were focused on finding the enemy and 
ensuring their safety at the expense of local population.  6) Warning shots were a 
standard method for getting the local peoples’ attention, not used solely as a measure of 
escalation of force in a confrontation with an unknown target. 
All of these factors led leaders in 1-87 to be reluctant to expose our soldiers to the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures that other units were employing prior to our 
assignment to these new areas of operations.  The over protection of friendly forces, 
reluctance to engage with locals, and generally hyper-offensive approach to operations 
meant that my company inherited a local population very dissatisfied and angered at the 
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U.S. Army.  The connection between the approach taken by the counterinsurgent and the 
support of the local population can be demonstrated by the lack of attacks within the 
town limits of Al-Shulla. 
Prior to A Company assignment to Al-Shulla, the previous units had been 
attacked on many times within the town limits and on the main highway.  In A 
Company’s first four month period, we were attacked once by a drive-by shooting (who 
we subsequently captured on the main highway), once by a sniper on the main highway 
south of Al-Shulla, and once by a mortar engagement on the very north edge of Al-










Figure 2.  Al-Shulla Area of Operations 
 
 I attribute this relative lack of enemy activity to our correct application of classic 
counterinsurgency techniques, the restrained and respectful manner in which A Company 
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soldiers operated during this period, and the subsequent support and cooperation we 
received from the local population and sources of influence in the area of operations. 
 All U.S. Army units were not operating in this manner.  Many units operated in an 
aggressive fashion, which was only exacerbated when the unit sustained casualties.  Even 
without specific knowledge of their involvement, leaders often would attribute some level 
of fault for their casualties to locals in the area of the event.  This led units and soldiers to 
see all Iraqis as possible enemies and inhibited their ability to engage with and gain the 
trust of local populations.  Evidence of similar actions can be seen in the behavior of 
Marines in the Haditha case.46  A contributing factor to the Haditha incident was the 
inclination of these soldiers to pursue a more aggressive approach that may not have been 
completely warranted by the situation.  Although the actions of these marine’s have been 
found to be within the bounds of their rules of engagement, the effects of their intended 
and collateral damage in this case had a very negative effect on the general Iraqi 
perception of all U.S. military tactics in Iraq. 
 Some attribute this to the “three block war”47 concept but the evidence suggests 
something else as units would operate differently given the same scenarios and 
circumstances and have differing results with locals.  This suggests the lack of a unified 
approach to conduct this conflict.  This lack of clarity flowed down to whatever level an 
individual commander made a concerted effort to unify the actions and doctrine of all of 
the elements under him or her.  This mostly occurred at the brigade level; in Baghdad, 
due to the larger population ratio and complexity of environment, it often shifted as low 
as the company level. 
2. Theme 2 of a Successful Counterinsurgency 
The counterinsurgent must fight the enemy’s ideology and methods, not the 
enemy directly.  The measures of success in a counterinsurgency must be defined in 
terms of defeating the enemy’s ideology and methods and not in terms of defeating the 
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http://www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,1174649,00.html, (accessed 14 November 2007). 
47 Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.” Marines 
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people identified as the enemy.  This is extremely significant for a counterinsurgent 
because the insurgent uses the support of the population in which he operates.  Therefore, 
eliminating the insurgent is like pulling the leaves off of a weed (the roots are still there) 
and even worse the act of pulling the weed often spreads the seeds for more weeds to 
grow.  This can be compared to the effects of collateral damage and injuries to neutral or 
friendly local populations.  Once the local population knows or perceives that the 
counterinsurgent is not executing operations in a manner that will protect them they may 
be inclined to side with the insurgent.48 
 Negative perceptions of the counterinsurgent are exacerbated when the 
counterinsurgent does not have a clear understanding of the culture or the complex nature 
of the given population.  Army leaders did not have a clear understanding of the culture 
and networks of influence in each of their assigned areas of operation, this shortcoming 
can be overcome by utilizing a restrained approach to operations and by taking the time 
to obtain information and situational understanding.  Neither of these options were 
available to Army units in 2004-2005.  Units were hamstrung by a lack of time and 
understanding when it came to identifying attainable goals; i.e., focus on identifying IED 
cells and insurgent and terrorist leaders for elimination.  When counter-terror objectives 
became the primary focus, they validated methods and tactics that often infuriated local 
populations.  These operations were detrimental when it came to gaining local support 
and “buy in” to facilitate economic and political improvement.  
As an example of focusing on the enemy rather then the method, I will recount a 
discussion with a senior officer about countering IED (improvised explosive device) 
operations on main supply routes in Baghdad.  It occurred during a meeting with the 
leadership of 1-87 in which we were discussing our tactics for countering IED activity in 
our area of operations.  We had had tangible success at reducing IED emplacement.  A 
Colonel, who was conducting a study of U.S. tactics, was leading the discussion with the 
intent of spreading useful tactics that had been used in other areas and to identify 
techniques we had found successful.  After some debate over what we were doing and 
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Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 423-452 (June 2006): 424. 
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what we were finding successful, the point was made, to the Colonel, that the only way to 
ensure coverage of a stretch of road was to have visibility of the stretch of road and have 
a unit dedicated to responding immediately to it.  This approach was identified by the 
Colonel as being defensive minded in that it required committing at least one patrol to 
one section of road (not more than 2 miles in length).  He concluded it was more effective 
to “hunt” the IED teams, under the assumption that once the team was eliminated the 
threat was eliminated.  Many of those present tried to explain that those emplacing the 
IEDs were likely unskilled hired labor and were essentially disposable to the leaders and 
planners of IED operations.  This Colonel became visibly agitated that this was not an 
offensive approach.  To attain tangible success, soldiers had to go on the offense and 
“take the fight to the enemy.”   It did not seem to matter that this was not the way we had 
already achieved tangible success in reducing the threat.    
  The scenario above illustrates a couple of issues for this study.  First, senior 
leaders had a preconceived idea about conducting the fight in an offensive manner.  
Second, innovation was occurring at the lowest tactical level throughout Iraq, but the gate 
holders for spreading successful tactics, techniques, and procedures had to believe in their 
utility for the ideas to spread.  Third, much of the U.S. Army approach to eliminating 
threats in Iraq was to focus directly on the enemy presenting the threat rather than 
disrupting or eliminating the conditions and facilitators of insurgent activities.  Focusing 
on gaining the support of the population was immensely more effective at eliminating 
IED teams than focusing on killing or capturing the teams directly.  Nevertheless, a 
majority of Army assets and operations were focused on killing IED teams rather than on 
fostering cooperation with local populations.   
Additionally, the idea of cooperation at the local level was not universally 
accepted as necessary for success in a counterinsurgency.  Many believed there were bad 
guys and good guys and all we had to do was identify the good guys and kill or capture 
all the bad ones.  The reality is that most were neither good nor bad--they were just trying 
to survive.  How the units conduct themselves convinces the local population to either 
support them or the insurgent.  As most counterinsurgency literature and FM 3-24 sites, 
the true good and bad elements in a counterinsurgency usually represent less than 20% of 
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the total population.  The vast majority will be neutral and based on the effectiveness of 
the counterinsurgent or the insurgent will be swayed to support one or the other. 
The commitment to offensive operations has other detrimental effects on a 
counterinsurgent force.  First, it inhibits innovation as lower level leaders start to doubt 
either their own approach or that of their leaders.  As a result units tend to adopt the first 
solution that satisfies the commander and has some level of success even if more 
successful methods are known.  Second, it reinforces ineffective methods because 
success is defined as meeting the commander’s expectations rather than meeting 
measures of effectiveness that are tied to an appropriate strategy.  Lastly, when methods 
and tactics are in question, soldiers will often be more reluctant to take risks, because it is 
rarely a secret in tactical units when they are doing something just because it is what “the 
boss wants done.” 
 While commanders are encouraged, in most circumstances, to question the 
mission and assigned tasks to clarify requirements and form a coherent picture of how 
their actions will contribute to overall objectives, questioning why we are choosing the 
course of action usually is not up for discussion.  Typical guidance is given through a 
mission statement, which always includes who, what, when, where, and why of the 
operation.  Information is also passed through the higher commander’s intent which 
provides the overall desired effect and thus contributes to a lower level commander’s 
ability to adjust actions to meet the commander’s stated intent.49  The rest of a typical 
operation order will provide the how, but many times a particular commander does not 
address why they have chosen the particular “how.”  Sometimes the stated “commander’s 
intent” is not the same as what lower level commanders perceive to be the performance 
measures that matter to their professional success. 
 This is not to suggest that commanders were asking subordinate units to do one 
thing and then expecting them to do another.  Instead this activity is rooted in the learned 
behavior and associated expectations of the higher commanders’ “lens” through which 
they view lower commanders’ actions.  These expectations go beyond the specific actions 
                                                 
49 Field Manual 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company, Headquarters Department of the Army, 
Washington D.C., July 2006, 2-10. 
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conducted in the heat of combat and tend to become more of a perception of how a unit 
conducts itself and much less about reality or specific performance measures that are 
established through clear guidance.   
 This gets to the heart of why the Army perpetuates an offensive nature in most 
operations it conducts.  It does so because it is what is expected and because a perceived 
offensive spirit in a unit and leader is highly prized, recognized, and rewarded.  It is now 
encapsulated as a portion of the “Warrior Ethos”50 but it has always been a central 
explanation of why the U.S. Army “wins” when all else is equal with an opponent.  When 
all else is equal, he who is more aggressive usually wins.  A failure to conduct yourself 
and your unit in an aggressive manner can be viewed in different ways by higher 
commanders.  It may be recognized as the smart, controlled, and confident approach or it 
maybe characterized as confused, slow to react, reluctant to fight, or most damning 
fearful of a fight.   
Another issue is why lower commanders are reluctant to question the “how” of an 
operation.  Company commanders are not young or slow folks, they are typically in their 
early 30s, have strong personalities and have a track record of success in life, academics, 
and the military that precedes them into command.  Most have committed to a career of 
the military and have to consider the impact of a negative review from a superior.  To 
question “how” a higher commander is choosing to conduct a mission can easily be 
construed as either mildly insubordinate, uncommitted to the mission, or lacking 
understanding of the tactical situation, all of which do not reflect well on a leader.  Thus, 
if lower commanders know their superior is offensively minded, and even if they disagree 
with the chosen course of action, they may be very reluctant to question senior officer’s 
orders or perceptions of reality. 
Ultimately, U.S. forces were focused on defeating named individuals or groups 
and the means to accomplish this defeat of the enemy was predominantly offensive in 
nature and did not adequately appreciate the negative effects of our methods. 
                                                 
50 Field Manual 1, The Army, Headquarters Department of the Army and Marine Corps, Washington 
DC, June 2005, iv.  
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3. Theme 3 of a Successful Counterinsurgency 
Legitimacy for the counterinsurgent and the host-nation government is 
paramount.  In light of theory and practice, attaining and sustaining legitimacy for the 
counterinsurgent is vitally important to receiving local support and to improve the 
security situation to attain strategic goals.  As a conflict continues, and starts to move into 
its second, third, fourth years, the local population must perceive the goals of the 
counterinsurgent are to transfer responsibility and authority over to local governance.  If 
this is not occurring fast enough, local populations will begin to resent the 
counterinsurgent force as the extension of the country sponsoring them and begin to 
suspect the goals of the counterinsurgent are nefarious or inconsistent with their goals.  In 
the 2004-2005 timeframe, even our staunchest supporters in Iraq began to question our 
motives and lack of success in revitalizing their economy and infrastructure.  This has 
often been referred to as the “Man on the Moon effect.”  Essentially, this means that the 
local perception, in other countries, is the United States has the resources and ability to 
accomplish whatever it wants.  This was demonstrated by our ability to put a man on the 
moon.  This verbiage is substantiated through personal interaction and communication 
with the Iraqis.51  
The United States had been slow in providing the needed improvements to 
security, social services, and political representation for many reasons.  One was our 
failure to use the right weapon for the task.  As David Kilcullen notes, “the best weapons 
for a COIN do not shoot.”52  Money, popular local support, and mutual respect are the 
weapons of choice in a counterinsurgency.  A wave or a smile will likely gain you more 
than a shout or a warning shot.  Weapons that shoot will have a positive effect on the 
enemy and negative effect on civilians.  Weapons that do not shoot can have a positive 
effect on both. 
                                                 
51 In a conversation in November 2005 with one of my interpreters, when asked his opinion of the 
local perception of the U.S., he replied, “ not good, most people think that since the U.S. has put a man on 
the moon providing simple things like adequate fuel, electricity, and security to Iraq should be easy”. 
52 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Article, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” 
Military Review, 3 (May-June 2006), 1-11. 
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 Although we trained to use money and to coordinate our efforts with other 
civilian agencies; it was extremely difficult, at the company level, to understand what 
other agencies were doing.  There was little money available to battalion level and below 
to employ at their discretion.  From the viewpoint of a company commander, the only 
money actually used was small rewards (a few hundred dollars) for tips that lead to 
weapons caches or the capture of known terrorists.  All civil service or infrastructure 
projects were incredibly cumbersome to submit and never resulted in anything happening 
in a timely manner.  The unit prior to mine and my unit, had submitted several 
construction projects for schools and medical facilities in Al-Shulla, but to my knowledge 
none were completed in the six months we were there.  The reality on the ground was we 
did not have the “best weapons” for the fight in which we were engaged. 
 If each company commander in Iraq had approximately $100,000 or even $10,000 
towards projects that they deemed necessary and utilized local means to accomplish these 
projects we would have had positive results.  This is a very small amount of money, when 
compared to the unknown billions of dollars that have been wasted, stolen, or otherwise 
misappropriated in Iraq.  Also, had we used smaller bases with local supply networks to 
support them, not only would we have encouraged local buy in (literally and figuratively) 
to our presence there, but we also would have pumped huge sums of money into the local 
economies.  This would have encouraged legitimate business and commerce rather than 
unwittingly spawning a black-market nightmare in almost every commodity.  Fuel finds 
its way quickly onto the black market due to its limited availability, black market vendors 
were on every street corner in Baghdad.   If U.S. forces had to engage the local markets 
for food, fuel, and housing (at least for part of their needs) it would have involved U.S. 
policy-makers in the pricing and supply of these commodities to each community, 
creating better insight and communication within these networks.  This type of venture 
could cause mass inflation, but limited U.S. entry into local markets could have had more 
positive effects of fostering stability and jump-starting economic activity in local 
communities.  In Baghdad, this could have been a pivotal effort in gaining the support of 
local groups who had influence in the communities. 
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 U.S. forces did not utilize economic programs because senior commanders did not 
trust the lowest level commanders with cash funds of any significance.  This reluctance to 
empower junior officers was regrettable because the only effective governance occurred 
at the local and neighborhood level.  Had the commanders who had responsibility for a 
town been able to stimulate their local economies and encourage cooperation between 
neighborhoods, the resulting economic activity could have spread to the district level and  
would have provided a needed incentive for cooperation between local and district level 
leadership. 
a. The Iraqi Face as a Puppet 
 A universal truth of counterinsurgency is you will never pass any of your 
operations to a host-nation if you do not first allow them the opportunity to learn from 
their own mistakes and grow in an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect.  This tenet 
was first noted by T.E. Lawrence in which he noted that, “it is their war, and you are to 
help them, not win it for them.”  However, we must acknowledge his reference to their 
ability to do something “tolerably”.53  The issue that develops is how long does the 
counterinsurgent continue to intervene and at what point does this intervention start to be 
regarded more as meddling and ensuring short term successes rather than as assisting the 
host-nation to gain capability. 
  U.S. officers and policy-makers in Iraq were primarily concerned in late 
2005 with facilitating a successful ratification of the constitution and subsequent election 
in December 2005.  Although everyone agreed that holding free and fair elections was 
our objective there was much debate about how we chose to ensure a successful election.  
Much time was spent in the area of operations identifying polling stations, coordinating 
activities with the different individuals involved in the voting process and securing the 
sites, and hardening polling sites.  Hardening polling sites was especially demanding 
because it involved physically transporting and emplacing hundreds of barriers and wire 
to mitigate perceived threats from vehicle born IEDs and coordinated attacks.  Closing 
streets to vehicles traffic also had a negative impact on the local economies.  Maintaining 
                                                 
53 T.E. Lawrence, “The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence”,The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, 
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/Lawrence _27_articles.htm, (accessed 20 November 2007). 
 52
security at polling places was considered central to ensuring a successful election, but 
other less disruptive and less expensive activities, out of necessity, received far less 
attention and assistance. 
  Ultimately we achieved a successful election without allowing a single 
attack on a polling station.  However, what other activities were ignored or moved to the 
bottom of the priority list by focusing so much on this one activity.  In Al-Shulla, for 
instance the recommendation was for far less physical hardening of individual polling 
sites and for U.S. forces to concentrate on monitoring key points of entry into the town, 
allowing the local security forces to focus on the individual security of each polling 
station.  This plan was dismissed immediately and a cookie cutter solution to secure each 
polling site was imposed from higher headquarters.  Apparently, senior U.S. officers did 
not trust the local security forces to provide for the security of each polling site or they 
did not trust the assessments of lower level commanders when it did not confirm the view 
of the situation held at headquarters.  
 This kind of micromanagement was a mistake that was repeatedly made 
by senior officers.  In the aforementioned example, the objective was to provide security 
to all polling sites and district election offices in the town (a total of nearly 60 in Al-
Shulla).  The initial task was for units to assess their area of operations and provide 
recommendations on how they would secure it.  Every company and battalion area of 
operations had a different number of polling sites within them, some as few as 10 and 
some as many as 60.  Each company then recommended their desired course of action to 
the battalion leadership.  The problem came when some commanders, who had fewer 
sites, recommended a much greater amount of physical hardening for each sites, while 
other commanders, who had more sites often within site of each other, recommended less 
individual hardening and a mutually supporting approach to the area.  Also, each 
company had to consider the security situation of their individual area of operations.   
 The reaction from battalion was such that it did not tell each commander 
what actions they should take; instead they would increase the information requirements 
and repeatedly suggest the upgrading of security measures whether or not they were 
needed.  The perception quickly became that unless each polling site was a fortress it was 
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not sufficient for the election.  Soon it became apparent there was almost a competition 
between units to have the most physically secured polling sites whether or not it actually 
helped or hindered other activities in the town.  Furthermore, little regard was given to 
how this glut of activity would impact other activities of the units and the towns in which 
they operated.  There was an overriding sense the right answer had already been 
determined at higher levels and that each company demonstrated their understanding of 
the operation by willingly coming on board with the “approved solution.”  Also, the 
method of ensuring a successful election only further demonstrated our complete 
unwillingness to rely on local security forces and governance to facilitate such an 
activity.  The largest contributing factor to this was our perception this was the “decisive 
point” of this phase of the Iraq War and was far too important to trust to the Iraqi security 
forces and governance.  While there is some relevance to this point we should have found 
small successes where we could have handed more responsibility and importance to local 
forces and officials. 
  Another issue during this time period was that the officers and non-
commissioned officers that were selected to lead and participate in transition teams or 
partner organizations.  These assignments, although named as one of the most important 
tasks for overall operations, were usually assigned to the least capable and expendable 
leaders.  From my brigade I can site the captain I replaced for company command was 
assigned to a military transition team for an Iraqi battalion partnered with our brigade.  
Senior officers apparently believed that he was not capable of leading a company in 
combat but he was capable of serving on a transition team.  And it says a great deal about 
the relative importance the U.S. Army was placing on filing transition teams with quality 
personnel.   
 Gaining legitimacy for our actions or for local governance and law 
enforcement was not a primary concern behind U.S. operations.  Evidence for this lack of 
interest was our assignment of weak leaders to positions related to transitioning authority 
and responsibility to the Iraqi government and security forces, lack of ability to have 
success across the spectrum of counterinsurgency tasks (economic, political, and 
security), and inability to use our money and resources effectively. 
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4. Theme 4 of a Successful Counterinsurgency 
The counterinsurgent must have a long-term commitment and be prepared to 
adapt.  Counterinsurgency doctrine must be as flexible and fluid as the enemy’s tactics.  
It is difficult for tactical commanders to be flexible, however, if higher levels of 
command are wedded to tactics, techniques, and procedures that are no longer effective.  
An example would be the guidance given for patrol size and composition in 2005.  Early 
in our rotation guidance was given that all patrols would consist of a minimum of four 
vehicles and 12 personnel.  Furthermore, it was mandated that each patrol had to remain 
in a mutually supporting posture.  The reasoning for this guidance was that there been an 
increase of enemy attacks on two or three vehicle convoys.  If one vehicle was engaged 
by an IED a single patrol would not have enough support to provide 360 degree security 
while recovering an immobile vehicle. 
 This guidance was appropriate for areas where convoys could not reasonably 
expect to get any quick assistance from adjacent units.  In Baghdad, however, this was 
not the case.  For instance, in Al-Shulla for a period of nearly six months there were at 
least two patrols (one platoon of soldiers and 8 vehicles) in a four square mile urban area 
for almost 100% of the time out of just my company.  There also were adjacent 
companies directly south and east of our area of operations that had similar levels of 
security. 
 The impact of the guidance was that it severely limited our options in how we 
could array our available forces.  We were essentially limited to assigning a patrol to one 
small area because all four vehicles had to remain very close to each other, and it was 
discouraged to place small elements of four or less soldiers in an observation post (an 
over watch position that was somewhat separated from their vehicle support).  Because 
most patrols had less than eight personnel to dismount, this limited a patrol to employing 
one observation post rather than multiple supporting positions. 
 As the months past in Baghdad, it became evident that we were not being attacked 
within our area of operations in Al-Shulla.  All attacks we received had been on the 
periphery of the town and were usually thwarted to some extent by local security forces.  
By November 2005 we had received one mortar attack, no damage or casualties; one 
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VBIED (vehicle-born IED), one vehicle damaged and two minor casualties; and one 
sniper attack, our only serious casualty of the deployment.  All other attacks had been 
stopped, mitigated, or responded to by local security forces (Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, or 
the local neighborhood watch).  
A Company focused its effort on maintaining restraint and building trust with 
local security forces which resulted in very high levels of cooperation with all security 
elements in Al-Shulla.  Consequently, a more dispersed approach to Al-Shulla proved to 
be appropriate.  We attempted separating four vehicle patrols into two vehicle sections 
and to consistently put out one or two OPs to cover more area or accomplish multiple 
tasks at the same time.  This approach proved difficult to pursue because every time a 
higher ranking officer or NCO passed through Al-Shulla and did not see a four vehicle 
patrol in the locations expected, they questioned how I was employing my units.   
 Ideally, pursuing this dispersion to the point that team sized elements (3-5 
personnel) patrolling the town with one vehicle in support would have been more 
appropriate to the security environment.  Each team element would have been mutually 
supporting with four to eight similar elements throughout the area of operations.  
Additionally, all elements would have been managed and tracked from a central base 
located in the town.   
 The evidence suggests that higher level commanders often mandated cookie cutter 
solutions that disregarded the gains to be made by utilizing more effective techniques.  
Often we were overly concerned with the short term goals at the expense of long term 
success.  Another explanation for the situation described above is that the higher 
commander’s goal of ensuring moderate casualties had priority over tactical 
effectiveness. 
Another example of inability to adapt is the choice of most units to base 
themselves on large forward operating bases such as Camp Liberty and to commute to 
work each day.  At the unit level, we never really considered the utility of being based in 
the neighborhoods prior to deployment.  Although it was recognized early on in our 
rotation that establishing smaller neighborhood bases would likely be more effective, the 
idea was never adopted in Baghdad.  Several reasons were behind our unwillingness to 
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spread out into company or platoon bases.  First, a recent suicide attack at a dining 
facility in Mosul (21 December 2004) seemed to suggest to many that security could only 
be found in deployments to large operating bases.  The prevailing wisdom was that if an 
insurgent could infiltrate a large installation then the prospect of infiltrating a small one 
such as a platoon or company base should be simple and the effect of and media attention 
given to a small attack overrunning any base would be catastrophic to the perception of 
U.S. dominance.  Second, there was a perception that we needed to keep our “footprint” 
small at the time.  One of the major points in the media at the time was the sheer number 
of U.S. installations being built in Iraq.54  Many Iraqis feared that because we were 
building so much we had designs to stay in the country permanently.  Therefore, 
increasing the number of bases, even small ones, was not considered.  Third, large bases 
increase protection and survivability by focusing large amounts of force protection 
materials, such as concrete walls, in a small geographic area.  This allows a larger 
number of forces to take advantage of an increased level of protection from a limited 
amount of assets.  Also, by concentrating forces duties can be distributed to individual 
units allowing certain units to focus on securing their areas of operation while other units 
can focus on force protection of the base.   
While there is some merit to each of these points, the reality was that bases in the 
neighborhoods would have been much simpler to protect than any large base.  Although a 
certain amount of force is required to protect a small base, those security forces usually 
could monitor events in areas of town near the base and thus could contribute to some 
extent to overall security in the area of operations.  Furthermore, when on a base of 100 
or less personnel, everyone knows exactly who should and should not be on the base, 
thus internal security is actually much greater than a large base.  Lastly, to date there has 
been no successful attempts at overrunning any size base.  Massing the enemy force to 
accomplish such a mission would easily be spotted, allowing reinforcements to be 
brought forward to defeat the attack. 
                                                 
54 This web site sums up one of the media topics of that time frame.  It can be proven in referencing 
the dates of the works sited by the page.  All of which date it to prior to May 2005.  
http://www.fcnl.org/iraq/bases.htm, (Accessed on 30 November 2007). 
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In regards to “footprint” this seems largely irrelevant and was more of a self-
assessment than an accurate assessment of how we were perceived by the locals.  
Consider that in the eyes of the Iraqi we are either there or not and they didn’t care 
whether we were on one large base or many small ones; their desire was and is for us to 
do our job and leave.     
Ultimately we failed to understand the impact we could have had by being 
deployed in smaller bases situated within the neighborhoods.  Although some lower level 
leaders were promoting the idea, senior officers were reluctant to accept the risk 
involved.  Admittedly, there was, as well, a reluctance to leave the relatively plush 
conditions of Camp Victory to voluntarily subject the unit to spartan conditions that 
would be necessary on a smaller base.   
C. CONCLUSION 
Many Army units in Iraq violated the tenets of a counterinsurgency.  No unity of 
effort or clarity of purpose existed in the form of doctrine or unifying strategy.  U.S. 
forces were almost solely focused on killing or capturing the enemy as a means to gain 
the support of the population, which was unfounded in theory and ineffective.  U.S. 
forces did not have a true commitment to the local government as the best means to 
maintain their legitimacy.  This was demonstrated repeatedly by reluctance to pass 
operations and responsibility over to the host nation to be handled “tolerably”.  U.S. 
forces also tended to view each rotation in isolation rather than as part of an on-going and 
continuing operation and senior leadership was high resistant to innovative or risky 
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V. APPLYING THEORY TO UNDERSTAND WHY  
This study will draw from theories to assist in understanding the performance of 
an organization such as the U.S. Army.  First, Organizational Theory provides 
explanatory power into the unique ways and reasons large organizations function and 
react specifically in regards to organizational change.  Second, Prospect Theory provides 
alternate perspective on how and why an individual or organization might react to their 
environment.  Explaining why the U.S. Army addressed organizational change is most 
convincing when presented from multiple view points or perspectives. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE 
The number of organization-focused theories is vast and has a large amount of 
literature in the fields of political science, international relations, and business.  Specific 
theories that provide explanatory power to military organizations grappling with change 
or innovation is the next focus.  Most organizational theory shares common aspects in the 
organizational-process model in that the actor is the organization itself.  Because 
organizations are basically locked into a certain process or means of execution, 
understanding that process can give predictive and explanatory power to the actions of 
the organization.  Organizational Theory focuses on the procedures that will lead to the 
desired interest.  These procedures become codified as standard operating procedures 
(SOP) which provide clarity to peoples’ actions, allow others to predict what one will do, 
and are necessary when attempting to coordinate the actions of many individuals within 
one organization.  According to Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, “Reliable 
performance of critical tasks and associated compliance with targets and constraints 
requires SOPs.”55  
Organizational culture also effects the decision making process.  Organizational 
culture is the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that 
                                                 
55 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
second edition, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 169. 
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contribute to collective understanding of the organization as an entity.56  Organizational 
culture provides the lens through which individuals within the organization view their 
actions and decisions.  As Kier identifies, “Organizational cultures define what is a 
problem and what is possible by focusing its members attention on certain features of 
events, institutions, and behaviors; how a problem is defined determines the range of 
possible solutions and strategies appropriate for solving it”.57  Military organizations 
have strong cultures due to their focus on long-term membership and powerful 
indoctrination techniques.58 
According to Organizational Theory: 1) organizations lose capability due to the 
necessary simplicity of SOPs; 2) SOPs limit options to given circumstances; 3) change is 
incremental and cannot occur quickly; 4) individuals within organizations have limited 
information and must perform standard actions without complete knowledge or 
understanding; and 5) implementation or output may not match desired outcome or 
decisions.59 
1. Applying Organizational Theory to Issues Identified 
One of the most difficult endeavors that a large organization can face is reacting 
to a new environment.  As Machiavelli noted, “there is nothing more difficult to carry 
out, nor doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of 
things”.60  In most organizational theory, most debate centers on defining issues that can 
be considered causal to change, or whether a certain variable can be considered necessary 
or sufficient to explain change in an organization.  Debate also exists in how individuals 
act as change agents in military organizations, whether it happens through civilian 
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direction, top-down guidance, bottom-up learning, the effect of “military mavericks” 61, 
or the effect of defeat and the subsequent acceptance of a need to change.  Most agree 
that change will not occur until the organization itself “buys in” to the need for change. 
At the tactical level, this can be an exasperating situation.  It is frustrating to know 
a certain method of accomplishing a given task is expected even when all evidence 
available to the tactical leader has demonstrated that an innovative technique to 
accomplishing the overall objective is available but outside the bounds existing standard 
operating procedures or measures of effectiveness established.  It becomes even more 
difficult to accept given the lip service senior officers and officials often give to the need 
to embrace change and innovation to enable success in the GWOT.62   
a. Organizational Behavior Theory on Innovation as an 
Explanation 
 According to Stephen Rosen, “Peacetime innovation has been possible 
when senior military officers with traditional credentials…have acted to create a new 
promotion pathway for junior officers practicing a new way of war.  Wartime 
innovation…has been most effective when associated with a redefinition of the measures 
of effectiveness employed by the military organization”.63 
 Some author’s question Rosen’s work because it lacks appreciation for the 
effect of organizational culture on innovation and because his argument is somewhat 
tautological.  In other words, the Army does not change because it is resistant to change, 
as provided from Deborah Avant of Rosen, “Principally military organizations are 
resistant to change”.64  Rosen’s primary contribution is his identification of the key 
aspects that facilitate change in war.  Rosen’s primary factor for change in wartime is the 
need to redefine our “measures of effectiveness.”  He identifies an important distinction 
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must be made between a major innovation and tactical innovation.  “A major innovation 
involves change in the concepts of operation of that combat arm.  That is, the ideas 
governing the ways it uses its force to win a campaign, as opposed to a tactical 
innovation, which is a change in the way individual weapons are applied to the target and 
environment in battle.”65  He also challenges the notion that, “The general idea that war 
provides the necessary environment for military learning and innovation is 
widespread.”66  He warns, “there are so many examples of military organizations that 
have been unable, for whatever reason, to learn from wartime experience that we are 
forced to be cautious in assuming that innovation during wartime is a straightforward 
matter of observing what works and what does not work in combat.”67  And adds that an 
answer to innovation in the military must begin with “an examination of the ways in 
which the military organizations collect and use information”.68 
 Rosen notes that militaries find it difficult to innovate when “a new 
wartime problem occurs that falls outside the parameters of established missions and 
concepts of operations”.  He relates this to how, “A thermostat has the overall goal of 
keeping a room’s temperature comfortable, but will not provide any data about the need 
to dehumidify air in the room.  So, too, existing military intelligence and administrative 
routines may not suggest the need for or value of innovation.”69 
 Rosen’s identifies the specific reasons why the Army usually fails to 
innovate in combat, “When military innovation is required in wartime, however, it is 
because an inappropriate strategic goal is being pursued, or because the relationship 
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are employed, but no matter how well, the war is not being won.  A new strategic goal 
must be selected and a new relationship between military operations and that goal must 
be defined.”70 
 Rosen can account for three of the four factors identified in this study that 
influenced the Army’s choice to use a counter-terror strategy.  Factor #1, was that Army 
officers were slow to accept that they lacked appropriate doctrine.  In accordance with the 
theory this would be expected of an organization such as the Army.  Also, the theory 
identifies that change would require a redefinition of goals to adapt to wartime tasks, but 
the Army lacked measures of effectiveness to identify the fact that existing practices were 
failing.  It also explains why we assumed we should use large bases (Factor #2) and why 
we managed our personnel poorly by adhering to SOPs in personnel matters and tactics 
(Factor #3).   
b. Organizational Culture Theory as an Explanation 
  For addressing this area of theory Elizabeth Kier has been selected.  She, 
“challenges the conventional wisdom about the origins of offensive and defensive 
military doctrine by arguing that military doctrine is best understood from a cultural 
perspective”.71  Kier’s primary contribution to this study is identifying that, “the 
military’s culture intervenes between civilian decisions and military doctrine”.72  In 
response to perceived threats to an organization’s culture it may circle the wagons.  “As 
the culture tightens, established methods and ideas become further entrenched and 
organization becomes increasingly unable to consider alternatives…strong cultures 
inhibit timely and innovative reactions.”73  Her work examines, “the ways in which 
officers’ beliefs and values (their organizational culture) influences their assessment of 
incoming information, their definition of the situation, and their identification and 
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valuation of options, as well as their choice of a course of action.  In short, it becomes 
easier to connect the phases of the policy process and to identify the reasons a particular 
doctrine was adopted.”74 
 Her strongest contribution, to this study, is the establishment of culture’s 
causal autonomy, “One of the ways of doing this is to show that the actor’s beliefs persist 
despite the fact that continuing to hold to those beliefs keeps them from achieving other 
important goals.”75  She also states the applicability of this model for wartime, “if there is 
any time an adversary (or external environment) should matter, it is during war.  
Examining wartime doctrinal change would either show the limits of this study’s 
argument or make an even stronger case for the explanatory power of military culture.”76 
 An interesting analogy the author makes of military culture is its 
description as a double-edged sword, “On the one hand, the consistency of beliefs in total 
institutions like the military means that most of its members have difficulty imagining 
that things could or should be done differently.  On the other hand, the military’s 
powerful assimilating mechanisms mean that once an organization gets behind an 
initiative to change aspects of its culture, change may be more feasible.”77  She also 
provides a useful warning to those speculating why the military is offensive minded.  
“Policy makers should… recognize that military resistance to defensive doctrines may 
not stem from the officer corps’ attempt to protect the offensive doctrine itself.  It may 
not be the offensive aspect of the doctrine that the military seeks to safeguard, but instead 
components within its organizational culture that they believe are integral to the 
successful implementation of their mission.  If defensive doctrines could be designed to 
incorporate those components of the military’s culture, then military resistance to the 
change would decrease.”78 
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 This theory provides explanatory power to why the Army struggled to 
change once it was clear to most that the strategy and tactics were not effective.  The idea 
of the Army culture “constricting” to limit options available has been demonstrated in 
this study to be very applicable to tactical leaders attempting to propose new approaches.  
Additionally, the reason we persisted for so long with an offensive approach to the war 
was from a heart felt belief that it was the appropriate method to win. 
 Kier’s theory provides great insight into why the Army persisted with an 
offensive approach to the war in Iraq.  It provides evidence of why, even when directed to 
embrace counterinsurgency, the Army continued to define success in terms of the 
offense.  This offensive mind set has been evidenced many times in this study.  The 
offensive spirit is the intervening variable between civilian direction to change and 
change actually occurring. 
 Kier also provides insight into why the Army did not use the best weapons 
for the job.  The organizational culture was set to use the tools in which it was familiar.  
Applying tools outside of the comfort zone can be identified as “threats” to core doctrine 
and tactics.  These perceived threats caused military leaders to become even more 
resistant to change and to use a selective approach to the missions on which they chose to 
focus.  Additionally, organizational theory, in general, provides that the Army would be 
resistant to using non-traditional methods out of concern that it would erode the 
traditional culture.  Another issue that inhibited change was the hierarchical command 
structure.  A mission command structure or flatter leadership approach would have been 
more conducive to innovation.  FM 3-24 identifies the need in a counterinsurgency 
environment for delegation of authority to the lowest level possible.79  Responsibility for 
an activity was delegated but not the authority for the resources and assets that could 
actually facilitate the goals desired.  By “holding the reins” of authority, senior officers 
restricted lower level leaders ability to solve new problems.    
 Organizational culture also provides insight into why lower level 
commanders in Iraq were experiencing task overload.  This can be explained by the “can 
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do” attitude that exists in the Army.  Although quality leaders are expected to 
acknowledge when they can not accomplish tasks, they rarely will.  The more preferred 
and expected response is for the subordinate to reorganize or work harder to facilitate the 
tasks being asked of them.  Also, companies and platoons typically had all they could 
handle with daily patrols and requirements.  Once additional requirements associated 
with surge operations or priority missions were added, daily duties often did not get the 
priority they deserved.  This “can do” attitude has existed within the Army culture for 
years.  Within a garrison environment this attitude is not a problem but when applied to a 
combat environment it can be counterproductive. 
 Organizational culture also helps to explain other causal factors behind the 
Army’s decision to choose a counter-terror strategy.  Part of the Army way of war is the 
belief that military operations can and should be fought in a manner that produces the 
least friendly casualties.  This approach is not a problem until the need for force 
protection starts to override mission effectiveness.  This problem can be identified as a 
primary reason for the use of large bases.  The majority of commanders were more 
concerned with ensuring casualties were kept to a minimum, which was supported by an 
Army culture that had come to embrace survivability as a primary variable in strategy 
formulation. 
c. Risk Aversion as an Explanation 
 Prospect theory is, “an alternative theory of choice under conditions of 
risk….people evaluate choices with respect to gains and losses from a reference point.  
They tend to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains and engage in risk-
averse behavior with respect to gains and risk-acceptant behavior with respect to 
losses”.80  This theory provides a great deal to understand the choices made by the Army.  
According to Rosen, “A major innovation is, by definition, unprecedented.  Even if that 
innovation takes place in wartime, there will not have been much relevant previous 
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experience.  The lack of precedent makes wartime innovation risky, and with risk often 
comes justified aversion.”81   
 Take for example the Army’s approach to Anbar province in comparison 
to Baghdad during the 2005-2006 timeframe.  For Anbar, it was clearly acknowledged 
that this area was in the realm of losses for the U.S.  For Baghdad, it had largely been 
considered to have had some level of gains throughout 2004-2005 and could thus be 
thought of in the realm of gains.  For Anbar, it was not until it was assumed irretrievably 
lost to Al-Qaeda influence that a risky and innovative approach was embraced.  For 
Baghdad, it was not until complete civil unrest (ignited by the Samarra bombing) that 
risky or innovative approaches were entertained.  In both, we can see that while the 
operation was in the realm of gains, the Army would not consider more risky tactics and 
approaches.  But once in the realm of losses, more risky and ultimately successful 
approaches were approved, used, and indoctrinated. 
 This adds explanatory power to why the Army was very reluctant to 
embrace change or more risk during the 2004-2005 timeframe in Iraq.  In large measure 
the Army was in the realm of gains.  It had facilitated a successful election in January 
2005, a successful Constitutional referendum in October 2005, and another successful 
election in December 2005.  From the view point of U.S. military commanders, to risk 
those gains by embracing risky and innovative approaches would have been unthinkable. 
 At the individual or small unit level it explains the typical performance of 
company level units and leaders in Iraq.  Many leaders were prone to be risk-averse.  This 
is expected, under this theory, if offensive tactics can provide the small measure of 
success to allow them into the realm of gains (i.e. capturing or killing suspected enemy 
fighters).  Once leaders identify themselves in the realm of gains, efforts cease to increase 
gains and efforts shift to maintaining them.  This explains why tactical commanders were 
prone to focus on force protection and to avoid using more risky techniques on the 
ground.  Quite simply they had had success and all that was left to be done was to 
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complete a tour losing as few men as possible, thus protecting the level of gain for the 
deployment as a whole. 
 This theory also explains why some company-level leader were averse to 
finding innovative solutions in that the mere assignment of a maneuver branch officer as 
a company commander in combat is highly coveted, even more so to have a successful 
review by his higher commanders.  To receive a positive evaluation, assimilation with the 
culture is expected.  Therefore, by virtue of their position, company-level leaders can feel 
they are in the realm of gains by being assigned to their position and echoing the 
approach of their higher commanders.  To embrace risky and innovative approaches can 
only be seen in the realm of gains if that is an output higher commanders have deemed 
necessary for success.  It has been shown that innovation outside of the parameters set by 
the culture of the Army was not desired or rewarded, thus cannot be considered in the 
realm of gains. 
B. CONCLUSION 
 Organizational theorists have provided much in the way of explanatory and 
predictive theories concerning why the military will or will not embrace change or 
innovation in tactics to respond to an unfamiliar environment or task.  This chapter has 
evidenced three theories (Organizational Behavior Theory, Organizational Culture 
Theory, and Prospect Theory) that not only provide explanation to why the Army did not, 
or was slow to, change in response to an unfamiliar task in Iraq, but also could have 
predicted that this would have occurred.  Evidence in this study has shown that many in 
the Army had knowledge of these theories and had identified the need for the Army to 
change.82  However, the inhibitor to change has been the universal acceptance of new 
doctrine and possibly a new definition of the Army’s culture.  This study has also 
identified that the primary source of the inhibition to change has been at the battalion and 
brigade level of command, based on organizational behavior and cultural theory; with an  
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added inhibition at the company level and below because of an aversion to professional 
risk and out of a need to mesh with the accepted culture of Army in order to be 
successful. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. CONCLUSIONS OF THIS STUDY 
The central aim of this study was to understand why tactical level leaders chose 
an inappropriate strategy to apply to the problem set given in Iraq in the 2004-2005 
timeframe.  To understand the context and content of the decisions made, empirical 
(experiences of the author and others) and normative (applicable academic theories) 
evidence was provided to form a complete answer.  This study has shown that although 
detailed and effective counterinsurgency strategy exists today, in 2004-2005, this doctrine 
was in its infancy (in the Army) and not well understood or accepted by leaders at all 
levels in the Army.  Because of this fact, the highest level military leaders effectively left 
the choice of doctrine applied at the tactical level solely in the hands of mid-level leaders, 
Battalion and Brigade Commanders.  In many instances, this resulted in Battalion and 
Brigade Commanders choosing doctrine that was more familiar to them and more 
oriented towards the Army’s traditional form of warfare.  Though these Commanders 
believed they were executing a counterinsurgency strategy, this study has shown that 
many units employed a strategy that could be better described as a counter-terror strategy. 
Due to this uneven application of doctrine all units were not unified in their 
approach to this conflict, many units using a counter-terror strategy contributed to a lack 
of unity of effort of U.S. forces, and actions of units violated most of the tenets 
established in effective counterinsurgency theory and practice.  This study has shown 
how and why the Army did not understand how their tactical level actions and strategy 
would contribute to and facilitate the operational and strategic goals for Iraq.  Many units 
employed a counter-terror strategy that focused on finding/killing/capturing named 
terrorist actors rather than focusing on interdicting the more powerful tool of the 
insurgent, his ideology.  The Army did not adequately appreciate or employ the actions 
necessary to establish and maintain our legitimacy and additionally did not appreciate the 
necessity to transition authority and responsibility for security, economic, and political 
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functions in a speedy manner to the host-nation.  The Army did a poor job of establishing 
the correct measures of effectives to guide our ability to adapt and to facilitate a long 
term commitment to the mission.  Additionally, Army leaders were prone to believe that 
all missions could be accomplished on their watch; therefore leaders were prone to 
pursue actions and measures of effectiveness that focused on short-term demonstrations 
of success rather than long-term contributions to a successful operational design. 
To provide many of “why” type answers to the selection of strategy by leaders, 
this study has shown that organizational theory provides a wealth of insight into how 
organizations and those acting within one, make decisions and innovate.  This study 
applied theories provided by various authors that give explanatory power to why the U.S. 
Army: Did not have established doctrine that was appropriate to conducting 
Counterinsurgency operations by conventional units.  This was because organizations are 
slow to learn and adapt to unfamiliar environments; Remained focused on using offensive 
tactics to achieve success.  This was because the culture of an organization has great 
influence on how organizations choose to approach problem solving.   
Since the U.S. Army highly prized and rewarded an offensive spirit, this 
influenced the types of tactics that were deemed appropriate to the problem set given.  
The Army remained wedded to a large Forward Operating Base mindset.  This was 
because organizations will remain committed to standard operating procedures even 
when they have stopped being effective.  Large organizations must use standard 
operating procedures in order to function effectively; however, once a standard operating 
procedure is established and supported it stops being connected to the original cause it 
was created to accomplish and becomes a means unto itself.  The Army did not have the 
right leadership or manage leadership effectively.  This was because the culture of an 
organization will tend to promote leaders and identify measures of success of leaders that 
are related to the culture and circumstances that created the highest level leaders not 
necessarily the attributes that are most effective and applicable to the current 
requirements of the organization. 
Additionally, several factors were identified and explained that contributed to the 
inability of the U.S. Army to adapt effectively once engaged in the conflict in Iraq.  The 
 73
lowest level tactical commanders were often reluctant or inhibited in their ability to find 
and spread innovative solutions to the new problems presented to them in Iraq.  This was 
because individuals and organizations will become risk averse once in the realm of 
relative gains and only risk taking when in the realm of relative loses.  The U.S. Army 
poorly used the most effective tools for a counterinsurgency, namely monetary means.  
This is because administrative bureaucracy and its expected delays and ineffectiveness 
are indicative of large organizations.  This did not mesh with the absolute need in Iraq for 
the lowest level leaders to have flexibility in application of the most effective weapons.  
In a counterinsurgency, the most effective weapons do not shoot and in Iraq the lowest 
level leaders could only control one weapon--the ones that did shoot.  Senior officers did 
not mitigate or correctly address the effects of task overload on the lowest level tactical 
units.  This prompted units to employ satisfying techniques in order to meet the 
unrealistic demands and thus rarely continued to pursue the most effective solutions to 
problems experienced.   
What this study suggests overall is that the Army tried to use old techniques and 
ideas to solve a problem that was known to be new and required innovation to deal with.  
There is no debate as to whether there exists a need in the Army to change to meet the 
requirements of winning in Iraq.  The only debate that exists is whether or not the United 
States should involve itself in conflicts that are not winnable by means of a high-intensity 
conflict.  What is evident from this study is that resistance to innovation was present in 
the Army during the 2004-2005 timeframe, what is not completely clear is what the 
motivations were for doing so.  This study has shown that a primary inhibitor to change 
in Iraq was the mid-level commanders stationed between those giving the guidance and 
doctrine and those having to execute it on the ground.  This study has demonstrated that 
innovation is almost always occurring at the lowest levels, if this is a measure of 
effectiveness of the commanders above them.  The true conduit for organizational change 
then becomes the recognition of effective measures at the lowest level by the Battalion 
and Brigade levels of command.  Without this recognition change will not spread and be 
“learned” by the organization. 
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 As addressed at the beginning of this study victory in a conflict requires properly 
understanding yourself, your enemy, and the fight you will encounter.  In at the least the 
first and third point this study has shown that the Army was deficient in its preparation 
for the Iraq War in 2004-2005.  Therefore, gaining a true understanding of U.S. Army 
capabilities and a clear picture of how a Counterinsurgency should be executed is of 
utmost relevance to the United States who needs to win in Iraq and will likely face 
similar conflicts in the future. 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 Based on the findings of this study, it is evident that the Army must have a 
defined doctrine and training regiment to address counterinsurgency as a mission.  Since 
much literature and doctrine for the Army has been developed in the course of the last 
year, it would appear that the Army as an organization has embraced the need for 
understanding and executing a counterinsurgency mission.  The recent successes in Iraq 
corroborate that current leadership in the Army assigned to Iraq is better trained and 
equipped to execute the mission assigned.  The question that remains is whether this 
embracing of counterinsurgency will be a replaying of how the Army responded to the 
need to address counterinsurgency in response to the Vietnam War or will the Army truly 
embrace counterinsurgency as a core competency?  This question is unanswerable at this 
time as written information and more importantly the personal substantiation of those 
within the Army organization is not available at this time.  This question will 
undoubtedly be a topic of many future studies. 
 An implication of this study that can be addressed is the need of greater scrutiny 
and diligence in assignment and evaluation of company through brigade commanders.  
Specifically, the Army needs to find a way to identify leaders that have attributes to be 
effective in a counterinsurgency environment and then needs to keep those identified as 
effective counterinsurgency commanders in position for longer periods of time in Iraq 
and similar conflicts.  A fundamental constraint to this would be the belief in the Army 
that it can create leaders and that the Army can train anyone to perform well in any form 
of warfare.  Most historical literature discounts this notion yet the Army seems wedded to 
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it.  Most information that the Army has published on how it will transform, identifies the 
transformation of the way that leaders think as a primary variable to the future success of 
the Army.83  However, little has been changed in the Army to weed out those that refuse 
or are unable to change their manner of thinking.  Additionally, few senior commanders 
are emplacing programs or incentives that encourage the transformation of thinking that 
is necessary for success in the future.  A new formalized evaluation system that 
incorporates the input from more than two superior leaders is what is needed in the Army 
to facilitate change.   
Colonel Steven Jones describes a 360 degree evaluation system that incorporates 
the input from peers and subordinates as well as superior officers in the evaluation of 
commanders.84  This type of evaluation system would ensure that the types of changes 
that are widely accepted by the military would necessarily have to be displayed by 
commanders at all levels in order to have professional success.  Under the current system 
that is not necessarily the case, rather a commander only has to execute within the 
measures of effectiveness of his two superior commanders.  Thus, even when most 
recognize a new tactic or technique is necessitated, if higher levels of command do not 
agree, mid-level commanders are inclined to side with their raters’ opinion. 
The last implication of this study is that having the same forces train for 
counterinsurgency and maneuver warfare may not be the most efficient or effective 
method to address either form of warfare.  Counterinsurgency warfare necessitates 
fundamentally different training methods, equipment, and key leadership traits in leaders 
than maneuver warfare.  Therefore it would seem most effective to have separately 
manned, trained, and equipped forces to address each form of warfare.  This study has 
demonstrated that it took the Army nearly three years to adapt to a counterinsurgency 
fight.  How long would it now take the Army to adapt to a different type conflict?  Likely 
not very long as most of those in positions of leadership in the Army have experience in 
maneuver warfare and could easily revert back.  The larger question is whether or not it is 
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important enough to the Army, and United States, for the Army to be able to successfully 
execute a counterinsurgency mission with conventional forces?  If yes to both then the 
Army must establish a means to institutionalize counterinsurgency warfare as a core 
competency of at least a portion of its forces as a primary mission.  Having 
counterinsurgency as a subset mission of Full-Spectrum Operations will not work long-
term as once the Army leaves Iraq effectively training leaders and soldiers in 
counterinsurgency warfare will become nearly impossible and the Army will once again 
revert to our preferred forms of offensive warfare.  Or the Army will try to train both at 
the same time and the result will be mediocrity in execution of both forms of warfare.  If 
being able to successfully execute counterinsurgency, with conventional Army units, is 
not important enough to institutionalize as a primary mission for at least a portion of the 
Army’s force, than future U.S. Administrations should strictly adhere to the tenets set 
forth in the Powell Doctrine. 
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